

May 24, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A2569

**L.B.J. Was on Top of the Crisis****EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

**HON. J. J. PICKLE**

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 24, 1965

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, I call your attention to two editorials—one from the Austin, Tex., Statesman on May 7, 1965, and the other from Life on May 14, 1965—concerning the U.S. action in the Dominican Republic. I found the point well taken, and I commend these editorials to the attention of my colleagues.

They follow:

[From the Austin (Tex.) Statesman, May 7, 1965]

**ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES TO SPONSOR A DOMINICA PEACE FORCE**

Though a truce between the contending factions in the Dominican Republic has been signed, its net effect still leaves much to be desired. Communist fire has continued, though seemingly at a lesser pace.

The lesson dealing with communism, hard-learned over the years, is that truces are made to be broken, just as treaties are made to be broken. They serve their purpose by gaining time for the Reds. But inevitably they are junked and conditions then relapse into greater disarray than before.

It required some fast footwork for the President to anticipate the Communist purpose of stealing the revolution and taking it out of the hands of the forces that have a stake in the sovereignty and future of Dominica.

The decision to send U.S. troops to the island Republic was a difficult one, but it was twice justified: To enable Americans and other affected nationalities to get out of Dominica in safety, and to nip in the bud a Communist takeover in the pattern of sequences followed by Fidel Castro in Cuba.

Thus it is a matter of some dismay why some nations of Latin America, all of whom have had run-ins with Communists and terrorists at one time or another, look with hostility on intervention in Dominica by the United States to prevent repetition of the conspiracy that made of Cuba a Soviet satellite.

President Johnson has repeatedly assured these critics that the United States will get out of Dominica when the mission of stamping out the Communist scheme is completed, or when the Organization of American States meets its responsibilities.

The OAS has divided support among the Latin American nations, and has always dragged its feet in an emergency while some members accuse the United States of having improper designs in its effort to prevent Communist takeovers in the New World. Now it has agreed to sponsor a peacekeeping force.

Critics of the President's action might well ask themselves the question of whether it would be right to stand idly by and permit the Dominican trouble to result in the imposition of a Communist dictatorship?

[From Life, May 14, 1965]

**L.B.J. WAS ON TOP OF THE CRISIS**

President Johnson's decision to send U.S. forces into the Dominican Republic was wise, courageous and timely. Depending on how successfully the United States is now able to follow through in a principled fashion, it may look equally good in longer retrospect.

The moment the rebel leadership was infiltrated by Castroite Communists, the re-

turn of former President Juan Bosch to the office he lost in a military coup 2 years ago ceased to be an acceptable solution to the crisis. Under Fidelista auspices, Bosch's brand of liberalism and ineffectual if well-meant anticommunism would have lasted about as long as an icicle on the Avenida Independencia.

The revolution in a few days destroyed all domestic authority. The rebel side was split three or four ways—among various schools of Communists, apparently sincere anti-Communist constitutionalists and a heavy admixture of trigger-happy kids. The "loyalists"—rightist military leaders—were also divided for a time. The civilian government of Donald Reid Cabral, which succeeded Bosch in 1963, disintegrated altogether 2 weeks ago. The resulting power vacuum has been filled by U.S. marines and airborne troops.

By intervening unilaterally in Santo Domingo, the United States broke the letter of the treaties governing inter-American relations, which called for collective hemispheric action or none at all. We also incurred, as the cost of our decisiveness, a propaganda disadvantage. But President Kennedy had already served warning that we could not afford to be bound to a dangerous do-nothing policy. If, he said in a 1961 speech, "the inter-American doctrine of noninterference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction . . . this government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are to the security of our Nation."

From the very first, however, President Johnson had sought to mobilize the 20-member Organization of American States, which is supposed to deal with crises like this. It proved difficult to get the OAS off the mark. Then last week the necessary 14 members gave grudging recognition to the necessity of our fast action and voted to establish an OAS military force to create "a climate of peace and conciliation" in war-ravaged Santo Domingo. The force will include some of the U.S. troops already there. With this significant break in OAS tradition it may be possible to inter-Americanize the peacekeeping function and eventually to set up a trusteeship council against the time when elections can be held.

The Dominican crisis has shown again that the danger of Castroism is still real. It even raises the somewhat nightmarish thought that a few hundred Fidelistas scattered about Latin America could cause the dispatch of thousands of U.S. troops. While our actions have given new life to the Monroe Doctrine, at the same time the very existence of the OAS makes the Monroe Doctrine a hemisphere affair. Hemisphere security has become a responsibility to be shared. Castorite subversion is far more a threat to other OAS members than it is to the United States. The clear need is for a permanent collective mechanism capable of combating such subversion wherever it surfaces. It is neither to our interest nor to the interest of the OAS that the United States should by default have to do the job alone.

**Protesting Too Little****EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

**HON. J. ARTHUR YOUNGER**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 24, 1965

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, in view of the fact that the House will shortly be considering the Housing Act of 1965,

I think it is well to give consideration to the points raised in the following editorial from the Wall Street Journal of May 19:

**PROTESTING TOO LITTLE**

People have been tolerating Federal subsidies in one form or another for so long that the administration's new rent subsidy proposal has stirred scarcely a ripple of protest.

The subsidy scheme—which officials call a rent supplement to make it sound more palatable—envisions church or other non-profit organizations building housing into which eligible families of low and moderate income would move, paying about 20 percent of their annual income as rent. The Federal subsidy would give the owners the difference between that amount and whatever an economic rent would be.

When the plan came to its first legislative hurdle in a House banking subcommittee the other day, the discussion did not center on whether the whole rent subsidy theory is unsound and ought to be thrown out of the proposed housing legislation. The question, rather, was whether the administration's formula was perhaps a bit too generous.

In some high-rent cities, as the administration wanted it, families with an annual income as high as \$8,550 could have part of their rent paid by the Government. The subcommittee members evidently concluded that as a little on the high side, for they reduced the ceiling to \$6,850, and they proportionately dropped the ceilings for cities where rents are lower.

However, this and other less consequential revisions do not face up squarely to the issue: Should the Government, already deep in the housing business and making a botch of it, go even deeper by handing out rent subsidies, no matter what income limitations arbitrarily are decided on? Surely our social and moral fabric is badly torn when hardly anybody sees anything wrong with a citizen being beholden to the Government for part of his rent for as long as 40 years, which is what the bill provides.

Yet the absence of any widespread outcry is not hard to explain. A sweating farmer on a tractor in Iowa, say, may mutter about the Government making him help to pay the rent for some city people in Pittsburgh or New York. But he isn't going to mutter much when, at the same time, the Government is making those city people help to pay subsidies for his farm. And that is the sorry state to which Government's extension of subsidies has come; who is there left to be free to cast the first stone?

**Health and Safety Committee Resolution****EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

**HON. JOEL T. BROYHILL**

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 24, 1965

Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Ruth Desmond, president of the Federation of Homemakers, and a tireless worker for the health safety of the people of our Nation, has asked that I commend a resolution unanimously passed by the board of management of her good organization to the Members of Congress for their consideration. I am happy to read this resolution into the Record so that my colleagues may have the opportunity to study its contents:

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Whereas scientific and technological changes have proliferated in the last two decades as never before, and

Whereas health hazards and threats to personal safety has also multiplied, and

Whereas there has been a vast increase of problems involving health and safety attending the expansion of novel practices in industry, agriculture, and Government, and

Whereas the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce has become increasingly burdened by the diversification of modern commerce and problems hitherto unknown to mankind, and

Whereas it is unlikely that even so dedicated a group of legislators as the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce can devote the necessary time and energy to the myriad tasks and responsibilities facing them, created by the aforesaid technological revolution: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That the Federation of Homemakers, a nationwide group of public-spirited housewives, requests the Congress of the United States to create a new standing committee in the House of Representatives to be known as the Committee on Health and Safety, and that this aforesaid committee be assigned the task of studying and reporting to the Congress and the public on all national problems relating to health and safety, and considering legislation which would vitally affect the public in these specific fields. Unanimously passed by the Board of Management of the Federation of Homemakers at its regular meeting, April 8, 1965.

RUTH G. DESMOND, *President*.

## Double Standard

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. MASTON O'NEAL

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 24, 1965

Mr. O'NEAL of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I submit the enclosed article by Mr. William Loeb, publisher of the *Manchester, N.H., Union Leader*. This timely and informative article has been reproduced on the front page of the *Cordele Dispatch* on May 11, 1965. The *Cordele Dispatch* is a widely read and much respected newspaper which is published by my good friends, E. W. and Jack C. Mathews of Cordele, Ga.

I commend this article to those who would not believe its context had it been written by a southern publisher. Mr. Loeb knows his subject very well and it is hoped that other editors and publishers will acquaint themselves with the subject as it truly exists:

## DOUBLE STANDARD

Two men died in the South on the same day. The emotionally hysterical civil rights supporters made sure that you knew all the details regarding the death of one of these men, the minister who was beaten by some white people in Selma after he had invaded their hometown and tragically died.

The other man, the story of whose death was buried on page 14 of our own paper—and probably wasn't mentioned at all in most papers—was that of 71-year-old Bank President Tom C. Woodruff, of Unadilla, Ga., who died from a fractured skull after having his fingers broken by robbers who tried to force him to open the vault of his bank. Two Negro schoolteachers from a nearby town are accused by the police of the crime.

Of \$3,780 found outside the vault, \$3,300 were found by the police locked in a closet in the classroom of one of the teachers.

There were no prayers for 71-year-old Bank President Tom C. Woodruff, who was kidnapped that Monday night when he returned from a church meeting. No ministers wept over him. No cardinal or archbishop offered prayers for him. President Johnson did not send his personal plane to bring relatives to the funeral. The President didn't call the family of Tom Woodruff on the phone.

Why the double standard? This newspaper will tell you why. It is because the uproar over voting rights in Alabama is carefully contrived by the Communists who are attempting to stir up discord between black and white in this country and to keep the Negro situation aggravated to the point where Negroes can be used as the shock troops of the revolution which the Communist Party plans in the United States.

So carefully organized is the hysteria over the civil rights issue that if the right button is pressed newspapers and radio commentators all over the United States go to work with sob stories about the so-called warriors for racial justice.

Whenever an unfortunate tragedy occurs, as in the Evers case or in the case of the Unitarian minister from Boston, this gives the Communists what they always want—a martyr. They have been lugging the bodies of their so-called martyrs through the streets from one end of this world to another ever since the Communist Party came into power in Russia, following the end of the First World War. This is a standard technique. If there aren't any martyrs, naturally, they see to it that some are made.

You don't see any of these sanctimonious civil rights talkers about colored murder, while 30 white people didn't lift a finger when they heard her screams under their windows. You never hear one of these hypocritical civil rights leaders talk about the necessity of Negroes behaving themselves like civilized people, not like animals. Yet when something happens as happened to the Unitarian minister, screams of anguish arise from one end of the country to the other and President Johnson plays right in with the propaganda plan because, of course, there are millions of Negro votes to be considered.

What about the white people? What about Bank President Tom C. Woodruff, who lived all his life as a respected citizen of Unadilla, Ga.? Did you hear any condemnation of this crime from the civil rights people? Did you hear one single word about the fact that the animals who robbed the bank, broke his fingers, one by one, trying to force him to open a vault that he couldn't open because it had a timelock on it and would not open again until the following morning in time for banking hours? Did you hear any outcry over the fact that the robbers fractured his skull and that they shot him once in the side before they fled with the \$3,780 that they found in the bank outside the vault? When the police and FBI agents arrested the two Negro schoolteachers, one of whom taught English and the other taught science in a nearby high school, did you hear any cries from civil rights on behalf of dead President Tom C. Woodruff? You did not and you will not.

This newspaper, like any decent American newspaper, detests violence against any citizen of the United States, white or black, but it is sick and tired of the double standard of those who would forgive the Negro every crime and only concentrate their condemnations against the white people in this country.

This is not justice. This is not even common sense. Just let them keep it up. What will happen in the United States, unfortunately, is not a gradual and sensible adjustment of the relationships between the races. What will come will be a revolution on the part of the black people that they are pro-

moting and, since there are nine whites to every colored person, the revolution will be put down in a bloodbath that will be on the shoulders of these phony crusaders.

WILLIAM LOEB, *Publisher*.

## Repairs To Avoid Repairs

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. J. ARTHUR YOUNGER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 24, 1965

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, much has been said and written about the international monetary situation and what should be done to protect and enhance our gold supply. The following editorial, which appeared in the *Wall Street Journal* on Thursday, May 13, sheds considerable light on this question:

## REVIEW AND OUTLOOK: REPAIRS TO AVOID REPAIRS

In the view of a number of bankers and economists, as well as an occasional peripatetic prime minister, the world is in danger of running out of spending money. If the international monetary machinery isn't overhauled soon to create lots more "liquidity," they contend, world trade simply may shrivel up.

It's a frightening picture, all right, but it's also one that appears to ignore a few simple principles of economics.

In the first place, as Professor Boarman stressed on this page the other day, day-to-day transactions in the markets of the world are not financed by passing out gold bars or otherwise digging into nations' monetary reserves. Such transactions are financed instead by extensions of ordinary commercial credit.

As a result, there is no necessary connection at all between the rate at which the world's liquidity grows and the speed at which trade expands. In the decade of the 1950's, for example, trade grew almost twice as fast as the world's monetary reserves.

Problems arise principally when one or more nations persistently spend, lend or invest more abroad than they take in from overseas. Other countries can be fairly patient, extending sizable amounts of credit for long periods of time, but eventually they are sure to insist on something more solid than credit.

Foreign nations have certainly been patient with the United States. Despite a healthy excess of exports over imports, this Nation for more than a decade has hardly ever been able to balance its income with its outgo, even for limited periods. Yet its creditors for years went on piling up dollar credits with hardly a murmur.

In the past few years, however, the creditors have become increasingly concerned. So they've been coming around with their dollar credits and insisting that the United States pay them off with its gold; since the end of 1958 America's holdings of gold have shrunk by about one-fourth. The foreigners' willingness to go on piling up dollar credits has been lessened, too, by America's evident unwillingness to put its own house in order.

Confidence in the dollar, for example, was hardly enhanced by Washington's proposed cut in tourists' customs allowances, its efforts to sell savings bonds to servicemen abroad, its emergency borrowings here and there overseas. For a good while the Government's efforts seemed either too small to matter or too likely only to postpone the day of reckoning.

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boycott questionnaire; representing an Israel company; promoting or selling products made in Israel; belonging to oversea Israel chambers of commerce.

The Arab boycott has obstructed foreign investment in Israel. It has succeeded in making Arab-Israel peace more remote. The Arabs will not admit that they are hurt by their insistence on a state of war with Israel; the Israeli do admit it; they want and need peace. The boycott impedes logical trade relationships between Israel and the Arab States, slowing Arab economic development and endangering Israel's economic security. The boycott prohibits free transit of people and literature. It discourages the exchange of ideas, breeds fear and distrust, and widens the gap for compromise and peaceful existence on both sides.

The Democratic and Republican platforms of 1960 pledged action against the Arab boycott and that year Congress adopted an amendment to our foreign aid program which provided that aid should be withheld from any country which persisted in boycotts and blockades. The amendment was supported by President Johnson and the late President Kennedy, both then Members of the Senate. It was adopted over opposition of the State Department, which feared, as today, that such legislation would be counterproductive.

It seems that everyone deplors the Arab boycott, but unfortunately the administration expresses concern over restrictive trade practices and boycotts between countries which are friendly to us, but opposes our amendment on the ground that it would weaken American effort to enlist other governments in our program of economic denial against Communist China, Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea, and on the grounds that it would challenge the Arab States to intensify their boycott rather than end it.

Yielding to blackmail, and cooperation with blackmailers, only makes it more difficult to extricate oneself. West Germany delayed far too long, and as a result when she did recognize Israel, 10 Arab States retaliated by "breaking relations." On the outset, Nasser threatened that he would recognize Communist East Germany if Bonn recognized Israel. But only 2 of the other 12 Arab States were willing to follow him, and Nasser had to back down.

The Arab boycott is directed at businessmen all over the world. There is nothing to stop them from such activities on their own soil, but conduct of Arab economic warfare on American soil should not be tolerated. By refusing to comply with boycott demands, small American business firms would have a Government export regulation to protect them if our amendment is approved. It would immunize American exporters of goods from involvement in foreign boycotts; it would protect our legitimate American business interests in foreign markets. It would contribute to export expansion and trade promotion and would assert our determination and intention to trade where we wish and in markets where there is demand for our American goods and services.

A united front of defiance would cut down the deceit and the distrust which the boycott has bred. We might ask: How can the vulnerable businessman defy the boycott when the most powerful government in the world, which should be his protector, does not protect him? The State Department, which is the logical agency to consult when there is threat from a foreign government, has failed to act forcefully to defend U.S. businessmen.

There is an erroneous notion that the United States practices trade restrictions similar to this boycott with respect to Communist countries. In our export regulations we control the utilization of only American products and resources. We do not presume to unilaterally control products originating

in a third country. This is contrary to America's sense of "fair play" in world trade. In the amendment before us, we seek fair play and Government protection for our American companies operating overseas.

The purpose of the anti-boycott legislation is to neutralize the effect in the United States of the Arab boycott and any comparable restrictions that may originate elsewhere on American firms by blocking the sources of information on which the restrictive practices thrive. The provisions of the bill affords a measure of Government protection to companies who desire to invoke it.

The restrictive remedy in the anti-boycott legislation would provide equal treatment for all American companies. Some American firms, because of their stature, resources, or strong competitive position, are able independently to resist Arab boycott pressures. However, there are other U.S. companies who consider themselves in a less favorable competitive position, and who, therefore, feel compelled to comply with requests for information from the Arab boycott organization.

Our Government should establish its opposition to this harassment and pressure against American firms and oppose any such trade practices which are designed to intimidate countries friendly to the United States.

Passage of this important piece of legislation will provide long overdue protection to American firms engaged in foreign commerce. I strongly commend it to you for your favorable consideration.

#### DOMINICAN CRISIS EMPHASIZES NECESSITY FOR REAFFIRMATION OF MONROE DOCTRINE

(Mr. FLOOD (at the request of Mr. BINGHAM) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, following the overthrow on April 24, 1965, of the Government of the Dominican Republic, a strategically located country on the rim of the Caribbean Basin, President Johnson acted with decisive promptness in landing U.S. forces to protect the lives of our citizens and other foreign nationals there, and to prevent a Red takeover of that island country. What he did was in line with the highest traditions and practices of our country.

Although the recent emergency appropriation by the Congress of \$700 million to cover the costs of military and naval operations in Santo Domingo and Vietnam is an important measure of approval, this action is not enough. There must be a positive clarification and reaffirmation of our historic policy of self-defense to show the world that our people and the Congress are squarely behind the President in combatting world conquest by the most sinister and brutal force in history. Also we must understand the significance of what was attempted in the Dominican Republic.

In anticipation of situations in the Caribbean such as that which erupted in Santo Domingo, on January 18, 1965, I introduced House Resolution 124 to extend the Monroe Doctrine to declare subversive domination or threat of it not only a violation of this doctrine but also of collective security as set forth in various acts and resolutions of the American Republics.

Because of the magnitude of the situation in which our country faces absolute

power, our statesmen and the Congress must show absolute fearlessness; and we must do it legally, forthrightly, and decisively for which purpose House Resolution 124 was formulated. I have written the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs requesting immediate hearings.

House Resolution 124 follows:

H. Res. 124

Whereas the subversive forces known as international communism, operating secretly and openly, directly and indirectly, threaten the sovereignty and political independence of all the Western Hemisphere nations; and

Whereas the American Continents, by the free and independent position which they have assumed and maintained, are not subject to colonization or domination by any power; and

Whereas the intervention of international communism, directly or indirectly, or however disguised, in any American state, conflicts with the established policy of the American Republics for the protection of the sovereignty of the peoples of such states and the political independence of their governments; and

Whereas such a situation extended to any portions of the Western Hemisphere is dangerous to the peace and safety of the whole of it, including the United States: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That (1) any such subversive domination or threat of it violates the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and of collective security as set forth in the acts and resolutions heretofore adopted by the American Republics; and

(2) That in any such situation any one or more of the high contracting parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance may, in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense, and in accordance with the declarations and principles above stated, take steps to forestall or combat intervention, domination, control, and colonization in whatever form, by the subversive forces known as international communism and its agencies in the Western Hemisphere.

#### SILVER DOLLARS

(Mr. FASCELL (at the request of Mr. BINGHAM) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, the announcement that the U.S. Mint will coin the 45 million silver dollars which were authorized by the Congress last July raises the serious question of what will happen to the dollars. Will they enter into circulation?

The Legal and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, of which I am chairman, delved into these possibilities in its studies of the coin shortage. I believe that the history of what has happened to the silver dollars which the United States as already coined throws great light on what is likely to become of the 45 million silver dollars.

In our coin shortage report, part 1, House Report No. 194, 89th Congress, 1st session, we said:

#### SILVER DOLLARS

Early in 1964, the Treasury ran out of silver dollars, and they became, in effect, collectors' items. There were 855,661,153 (including 50,028 Lafayette commemorative), standard silver dollars minted between 1793 and 1935. None has been minted since 1935.

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According to the Treasury's circulation statement of U.S. money the stock of silver dollars consisted of 484,722 as of May 31, 1964 (including 2,945,754 held by the Treasury, and 49,242 held by the Federal Reserve banks and agents).

During the 5 fiscal year periods 1954-59 the silver dollar stock of the Treasury was reduced from 275,903,801 pieces to 194,411,064, a net reduction of 81,492,737, for an average of 16,298,547 silver dollars per year. During the same period the Federal Reserve System had a net increase of 4,559,676 pieces, a fact which indicates there was then no excessive demand for silver dollars.

In fiscal year 1960 the Treasury had a net loss of 20,096,777 silver dollars. The net losses increased to 25,141,341 in 1961, to 33,685,667 in 1962, to 49,726,664 in 1963, and to 62,817,320 in 1964. The Federal Reserve System had a net increase of silver dollars until 1963, when it had a net loss of 3,510,255 and a net loss of 8,710,203 in 1964. Both the Treasury's and the Federal Reserve System's stocks were then virtually depleted.

Hoarding of silver dollars has undoubtedly been encouraged by the rise in the price of silver and the fact that a silver dollar is now worth a dollar in silver. The price of silver is \$1.293 an ounce. Tending to keep the market price at its present level is existing law, which makes silver certificates exchangeable on demand at the Treasury, for silver dollars, or at the option of the Secretary, for silver bullion of equal monetary value.

Because silver users can obtain their requirements from the Treasury by exchanging silver certificates for silver bullion, the price tends to stabilize at \$1.29 plus per ounce.

According to the Treasury witness, "If we stopped redeeming silver certificates for silver, undoubtedly the price would go up. If it went up to \$1.38 an ounce, then all our other silver coins would be taken out of circulation the same as our silver dollars have been, so that would, we believe, be quite catastrophic." He further said that "There would be no seigniorage, if the price went up to \$1.38 on those coins, because it would cost the same amount as the coin to make it. If it went beyond that, all these coins would be taken off the market and melted, so that we would lose all these coins."

In that connection testimony was received concerning the wartime (1942-45) 5-cent pieces. Due to the shortage of nickel, about 35 percent of the metal content of the coin was silver. That silver is now worth about 7 cents, and large quantities of that piece are being melted down to recover the silver.

In March 1964 there was a run on the Treasury in Washington for silver dollars. Buyers were permitted as many as 50,000 pieces per day, the equivalent of 1½ tons, or 50 bags of 80 pounds each. There was no requirement that silver certificates be presented for silver dollars. By March 25 the supply of silver dollars had dwindled from 24,268,648 on February 29, 1964, to about 3 million, and the Treasury suspended further sales. Soon after it also suspended the public sale of any rolled coin at the cash room, U.S. Treasurer's Office.

On March 26, the Legal and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee requested the Secretary of the Treasury to supply information regarding the effect the run had had on the efficiency and economy of Treasury operations. The Treasury was asked to furnish the basis for its restriction which had limited purchasers to \$50,000, and how that sum had been fixed. The Treasury's full response to that question was that:

"Restrictions were placed on the exchanges of silver dollars only to the extent that physical considerations demanded them. It was found that they were necessary to some extent both as to amounts and times of redemption. The determinations made from time to time were based upon the availability of our facilities for such purposes."

The fact that the Treasury was quickly obliged to embargo completely the exchange of silver dollars bespeaks the inadequacy of the restriction it had earlier imposed. Had the Treasury desired to rid itself of all the silver dollars it possessed it could hardly have selected a better way of doing it.

On July 23, 1964, the Secretary of the Treasury recommended to the chairman of the Treasury-Post Office Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee that 45 million silver dollars be minted in fiscal 1965 at the Denver Mint. He said (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, p. A3847):

"It would be our policy to distribute the silver dollars through the Federal Reserve banks in the West where they are used as a medium of exchange. We would not use them in redemption of silver certificates at the Treasury."

According to the Secretary:

"Use of the silver dollar will, to a great extent in the West at least, alleviate the heavy demands we have had on the quarter and 50-cent pieces. This eventually will about balance out the use of silver, as the mining of enough halves and quarters to substitute for the 45 million silver dollars will take almost as much metal for the same end use."

The Secretary's statements need to be considered in the light of several facts. First, the silver dollar is the only coin for which a paper substitute is in plentiful supply. Second, subsidiary coins contain about 7 percent less silver than do silver dollars. Two halves, four quarters, or ten dimes could be minted instead of one silver dollar, with about 7 percent less silver.

While silver dollars are traditionally associated with the West, the Treasury's obligation is to supply coin for the entire United States. Properly, it would seem, the silver dollars which have been authorized should be distributed equitably and fairly throughout the country when produced.

The fact that silver dollars have almost completely disappeared from circulation (272,060,506 since 1964) indicates the possibility that the 45 million pieces (and their content of some 34.8 million ounces of fine silver, about a 1-year U.S. production) will also disappear from circulation, unless stringent safeguards are imposed.

Mr. Speaker, practically all of the silver dollars that the United States has ever minted, in its entire history, have disappeared from circulation. The subcommittee was not alone in cautioning of the possibility that the 45 million silver dollars likewise would disappear. A Wall Street Journal article of August 4, 1964, under the headline of "Silver Dollars To Be Minted This Year Will Soon Vanish, Bankers Fear," said:

The 45 million new silver dollars Congress authorized last month will be squirreled away by collectors as fast as they appear, some bankers say. They note some 90 million new Kennedy half dollars are largely in dealers' and collectors' hands rather than in circulation. Coin dealers already talk of getting as much as \$5 for a single new cartwheel.

The mint's dollar run will drain 38,670,000 ounces of silver from the Treasury's fading stocks. Some retailers and bankers call the dollar output a waste of silver and the mint's time. They argue stores and banks are starving for smaller coins, not dollars.

Similar beliefs that the dollars will be hoarded or collected, and never actually circulate, have been expressed since the announcement was made last week that they are now scheduled for minting. The Washington Evening Star for May 19, 1965, for example, contained an Associated Press article, headlined "Silver

Dollars To Roll, But Not Very Far." I believe the contents of the article are of interest to every Member, and, in fact, to every person in the United States who is interested in our coin problems:

SILVER DOLLARS TO ROLL, BUT NOT VERY FAR

NEW YORK.—Silver cartwheels are scheduled to roll out of the Denver mint soon, but they'll probably roll right into the pockets of souvenir hunters and speculators and never be seen again.

The 45 million silver dollars by June 30 would be the first to be minted in three decades. They should be worth at least \$2 each, coin dealers say.

"It's ridiculous," said Tom Wass, president of International Numismatic Corp., yesterday. "Everybody's crying about the silver shortage and now the Government's throwing away \$45 million on silver dollars nobody needs."

Benjamin Stack, a partner in Stack's Coin Co. and a member of the U.S. Assay Commission, said: "I'm absolutely stunned. Those silver dollars will never even get into the collectors' hands, much less the public's. The speculation will be tremendous. It will be an absolute mess."

The speculators would be betting on an increase in the price of silver or in the numismatic value of the dollars.

The Silver Users Association, an industry group, also believes that the new silver dollars would disappear immediately. Even silver producer interests indicate surprise at the order for minting them.

The Treasury and Federal Reserve System said they have not yet worked out a plan for distribution.

President Johnson gave the go-ahead to make the silver dollars over the weekend, noting that Congress appropriated \$600,000 for the minting last year.

The mint turned out more than 855 million cartwheels between 1794 and 1935, but none is in general circulation today and coin dealers ask as much as \$1.50 for even the most common specimens.

Mr. Freeman Bishop, a staff writer for the American Metal Market, writing in that publication for Tuesday, May 18, 1965, also stated that the silver dollars are "likely to go to collectors quickly." Mr. Bishop's article follows:

TO MINT 45 MILLION SILVER DOLLARS; LIKELY TO GO TO COLLECTORS QUICKLY  
(By Freeman Bishop)

WASHINGTON.—President Johnson's surprising approval for minting 45 million silver dollars stirred speculation here that "the back of the silver coin shortage has been broken."

The announcement that the mint will start turning out the 45 million silver dollars (dated 1964) authorized last year by the Congress is interpreted as a prelude to release later this week of the Treasury's silver report.

The silver dollar production authority would have expired on July 1. While the statement designated distribution in parts of the country where "the silver dollar has traditionally been used as a medium of exchange," collectors and coin experts predicted few of the silver dollars will be in circulation for long. Some dealers have given a tentative value of \$5 to the new 1964-dated cartwheels.

The Treasury also is holding nearly 3 million Morgan silver dollars and has refused to turn them over to the public on the grounds their value as collectors' items would be an immediate windfall.

Most experts here see this same fate overtaking the silver dollars scheduled for production this month and the first output in 30 years.



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of Representatives. Senate Joint Resolution 65 is identical in text with that earlier proposal with the following two exceptions: (1) The compensation of the Curator would be set at \$22,000 rather than at \$17,500; and (2) the expense authorization of the Commission would be set at \$15,000 per fiscal year rather than at \$10,000.

## PURPOSE

The underlying objective of Senate Joint Resolution 65 is to centralize responsibility for the preservation and enhancement of the Capitol's work of art and historical objects in a bipartisan Commission on Art and Antiquities of the Capitol. The Commission would be empowered to select a Curator of Art and Antiquities of the Capitol to safeguard, maintain, and bring to greater public awareness the treasures of art, culture, antiquity, and architecture contained in the Capitol. In addition, the measure contains ancillary provisions to carry out its general purposes, as indicated in the summary-analysis below.

Further explanation of the background and objectives of Senate Joint Resolution 65 is contained in a statement made by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, its principal author, on March 22, 1965, when he introduced the measure in the Senate. His statement is as follows:

## "CURATOR OF ARTS AND ANTIQUITIES

"Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, recent acts of vandalism in the Corcoran Gallery underscore a problem in the Capitol which Members of the Senate sought to deal with several years ago. On June 6, 1962, I introduced on behalf of myself, Senator DIRKSEN, the minority leader, the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], and the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. JORDAN] Senate Joint Resolution 195 entitled 'Joint resolution establishing the Commission on Arts and Antiquities of the Capitol, and for other purposes.' On July 18, 1962, the Senate passed the bill but it died in the House Committee on Administration.

"The art treasures and antiquities that have accrued to the Congress over the years represent an immensely valuable and irreplaceable part of our American heritage. This collection should be assured maximum safety and should be treated in an integrated fashion. But at the present time no single body in the Congress is charged with its care. The Capitol Architect, committees of each House, and other custodians do the best they can to preserve portions of the collection over which, in a somewhat haphazard fashion, they have been assigned jurisdiction through the years. But it is likely that in years past much of value has been lost. And there is no question that what remains can be more effectively utilized in an inspirational, educational, and patriotic sense. What is involved are priceless benchmarks of our society and its history which have been entrusted to us for safekeeping. The Congress has a responsibility to see to it that they are passed along unscathed and undiminished. These paintings, books, furniture, statues and other historic items belong to all generations of Americans, past, present, and future. Their preservation is a responsibility which cannot be taken lightly, for once marred, lost or destroyed they can never be replaced, and acts of vandalism, may I say, are not unknown in the Capitol.

"I call to the attention of the Senate the fact that Senate Joint Resolution 195 in the 87th Congress had the strong endorsement and support of the minority leader and other Senators who share a keen interest in our past history and its tangible legacies. The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration at that time also gave its unanimous support to the resolution which the Senate proceeded to adopt on a bipartisan basis.

"Since the House did not act one way or the other on the proposal to establish a joint

commission and to provide for a Curator of Arts and Antiquities, I again offer at this time a similar resolution. The purpose of this resolution is to provide coordinated protection and the best possible utilization of the objects of art and the antiquities of the Capitol for the mutual benefit of the tens of thousands of visitors who come to their Capitol each year and the Members of Congress.

"Briefly, the resolution would create a commission comprised of the Speaker of the House, the Vice President, the chairman and the ranking minority members of the Senate Rules Committee and the House Administration Committee, and the Architect of the Capitol. It would, as well, create the position of Curator of Arts and Antiquities. I would hope and expect that the Commission would choose for this position on a completely nonpartisan basis an outstanding authority on arts and antiquities and their preservation and display.

"If the joint resolution is passed by the Senate, I hope the House will see fit to consider this pressing need and concur with the Senate in establishing a Commission on Art and Antiquities of the Capitol."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution is before the Senate and open to amendment. If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed, as follows:

S.J. Res. 65

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) there is hereby established a Commission on Art and Antiquities of the Capitol (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission") consisting of the Vice President of the United States, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives, and the Architect of the Capitol.*

*(b) The Commission shall elect a Chairman and a Vice Chairman at the beginning of each Congress. Four members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, except that the Commission may fix a lesser number which shall constitute a quorum for the taking of testimony.*

*(c) The Commission shall select a Curator of Art and Antiquities of the Capitol who shall be an employee of the Office of the Architect of the Capitol. The Curator shall serve at the pleasure of the Commission, shall perform such duties as it may prescribe, and shall receive compensation at a gross rate, not to exceed \$22,000 per annum to be fixed by the Commission. At the request of the Commission the Architect of the Capitol shall detail to the Commission such additional professional, clerical, and other assistants as, from time to time, it deems necessary.*

*(d) The Commission shall be empowered to hold hearings, summon witnesses, administer oaths, employ reporters, request the production of papers and records, take such testimony, and adopt such rules for the conduct of its hearings and meetings, as it deems necessary.*

*Sec. 2. (a) The Commission is hereby authorized and directed to supervise, hold, place, and protect all works of art, historical objects, and exhibits within the Capitol, and in all rooms, spaces, and corridors thereof, which are the property of the United States, and in its judgment to accept any works of art, historical objects, or exhibits which may*

hereafter be offered, given, or devised to the Congress, its committees, and its officers for placement and exhibition in the Capitol, or in rooms, spaces, or corridors thereof.

*(b) The Commission shall prescribe such regulations as it deems necessary for the care, protection, and placement of such works of art, exhibits, and historical objects in the Capitol and the Senate and House Office Buildings, and for their acceptance on behalf of the Congress, its committees, and others. Such regulations shall be published in the Congressional Record at such time or times as the Commission may deem necessary for the information of the Members of Congress and the public.*

*(c) Regulations authorized by the provisions of section 1820 of the Revised Statutes (40 U.S.C. 193) to be issued by the Sergeants at Arms of the Senate and the House of Representatives for the protection of the Capitol, and any regulations issued, or activities undertaken, by the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives, or the Architect of the Capitol, in carrying out duties relating to the care, preservation, and protection of the Capitol and the Senate and House Office Buildings, shall be consistent with such rules and regulations as the Commission may issue pursuant to subsection (b).*

*(d) The Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate and the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives, with the advice of the Architect of the Capitol and consistent with regulations prescribed by the Commission under subsection (b), shall have responsibility for the supervision, protection, and placement of all works of art, historical objects, and exhibits which shall have been accepted on behalf of the Congress by the Capitol Commission or acknowledged as United States property by inventory of the Commission, and which may be lodged in the Senate and House Office Buildings, respectively, by the Commission.*

*Sec. 3. (a) The Commission shall have responsibility for the supervision and maintenance of the National Statuary Hall and the old Senate Chamber on the principal floor of the Senate wing of the Capitol insofar as they are to be preserved as patriotic shrines in the Capitol for the benefit of the Congress and the people of the United States.*

*(b) The Commission, with the advice of the Commission of Fine Arts, is authorized and directed to relocate within the Capitol any of the statues already received and placed in the National Statuary Hall, and to provide for the reception and location of the statues which hereafter may be received from the States pursuant to section 1814 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (40 U.S.C. 187).*

*Sec. 4. Whoever willfully defaces, injures, or damages any work of art, historical object, exhibit, or architectural feature in the Capitol or in the Senate and House Office Buildings, which is the property of the United States, or violates any of the provisions of the regulations adopted by the Commission for their care and protection, shall be fined not more than \$100 or imprisoned not more than sixty days, or both, and prosecution for such offense shall be had in the municipal court of the District of Columbia, upon information by the United States attorney or any of his assistants: *Provided*, That in any case where, in the commission of an offense under this section, any such work of art, historical object, exhibit, or architectural feature is damaged in an amount exceeding \$100, the amount of the fine for the offense may be not more than \$5,000, the period of imprisonment for the offense may be not more than five years, and prosecution therefor shall be had in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by indictment except that, if the defendant after he has been advised of*

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the nature of the charge and his rights waived in open court prosecution by indictment, such prosecution may be upon information by the United States attorney or any of his assistants.

Sec. 5. The Commission shall, from time to time, but at least once every ten years, publish as a Senate or House document a list of all works of art, historical objects, and exhibits currently within the Capitol and the Senate and House Office Buildings, together with their description, location, and with such notes as may be pertinent to their history.

Sec. 6. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the expenses of the Commission the sum of \$15,000 each fiscal year, to be disbursed by the Secretary of the Senate on vouchers signed by the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Commission. Payment on such vouchers shall be deemed and are hereby declared to be conclusive upon all departments and officers of the Government, and these vouchers shall be reported in the annual report of the Secretary of the Senate: *Provided*, That no payment shall be made from such appropriation as salary.

Sec. 7. (a) The first sentence of section 1814 of the Revised Statutes (40 U.S.C. 187) is amended to read as follows: "Suitable structures and railings shall be erected in the old hall of Representatives for the reception and protection of statuary, and the same shall be under the supervision and direction of the Commission on Art and Antiquities of the Capitol."

(b) Section 1831 of the Revised Statutes (40 U.S.C. 188) is repealed.

(c) Section 1815 of the Revised Statutes, (40 U.S.C. 189), is amended to read as follows: "Sec. 1815. No work of art or manufacture other than the property of the United States shall be exhibited in the National Statuary Hall, the rotunda, or the corridors of the Capitol, and no work of art or exhibit shall be offered for sale or displayed for gain in any of the rooms, spaces, or corridors of the Capitol or of the Senate or House Office Buildings."

(d) The paragraph under the heading "Miscellaneous", relating to the use of rooms in the Capitol for private studios or works of art, in the Act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. 576; 40 U.S.C. 190) is amended to read as follows:

"No room in the Capitol shall be used for private studios or works of arts, without permission from the Commission on Art and Antiquities of the Capitol, given in writing."

(e) The second paragraph under the heading "Public Buildings" in the appropriations for the Department of the Interior in the Act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat. 391), is repealed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution was passed.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

# THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, this morning's newspapers carry the report that an agreement has been reached by the United States and the rebels on the new Dominican governmental setup. The report states that a choice has been made as to who shall act as the President of the Dominican Republic. The selectee is Antonio Guzman. He was a member of the Bosch government before its overthrow in 1963.

The report further declares that participants in the discussion in the Dominican Republic are on their way back to Washington to submit the name of Antonio Guzman to be President.

What has been proposed is a coalition government. My purpose in speaking on this subject is to express my apprehension that in the selection of the coalition government we may find ourselves in the position that we occupied when Castro was allowed to become the leader of Cuba.

In 1963 the evidence clearly showed that the Bosch government was overthrown because Bosch, a poet and idealist, had no sense of reality. The testimony given before the Foreign Relations Committee was to the effect that Bosch allowed the Government radio to be used by the Communists in propagandizing the citizens of the Republic. He also allowed the Communists to use school buildings for the purpose of indoctrinating citizens of the Dominican Republic in communism. Third, he allowed the youth of the Dominican Republic to go to Cuba to be trained in communism. Fourth, he allowed the leaders of the exiled Communists to return to the Dominican Republic and to operate.

The practically unanimous judgment of businessmen, professional men, merchants, miners, and others was that communism was about to take charge of the Dominican Republic. It was then also said that in the Bosch government were some men of character friendly to our cause.

However, the real reason for the overthrow was the fear that Communists would take charge. I do not know the background of Guzman; nor the background of the men who have been chosen to constitute the coalition government. My only purpose in making this statement today is to call upon our Government to make sure that those who are to take part in the coalition government will not be hostile to our cause and friendly to the cause of communism. We cannot have another Communist government off our southern shores. If that happens, all the problems which we now feel to be grave will become inconsequential in the multiplication of difficulties.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 2 more minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator may proceed.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Experienced in the world has shown that coalition governments are finally taken over by the Communists. I assume that Bundy and the other men who were in the Dominican Republic were conscious of this danger. However, I would not be fair to myself unless I made the statement today that I have grave apprehensions that the result will be that the coalition government will finally be found to be on the side of the Communists.

I sincerely hope and pray that that will not happen, but I felt impelled to make that statement expressing my views for whatever they may be worth.

## REMARKS BY SENATOR MANSFIELD AT JEFFERSON-JACKSON DAY DINNER

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a speech delivered by me at the Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner at the Armory, Wilmington, Del., on May 15, 1965.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD, DEMOCRAT, OF MONTANA, AT THE JEFFERSON-JACKSON DAY DINNER, THE ARMORY, WILMINGTON, DEL., MAY 15, 1965

I came here this afternoon by plane. It is a very pleasant flight. It is mostly over Democratic territory—in Maryland and in Delaware. Not that you can recognize Democrats from the air. But you can see the hallmarks of the Democratic Party—smoke rising from busy industrial plants and fine crops on rich farmlands.

I was also going to claim the beauty of Delaware beaches for the party. But there are limits to partisanship—even at a Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner. This lovely stretch of sand, sea, and inlets is above politics. Nevertheless, Delaware's Riviera does give point to the President's suggestion that we spend some travel dollars in the United States. So far as I can see, these beaches have just about everything that you find on the French Riviera except, perhaps, Brigitte Bardot.

If there are any travel dollars to spare here—after this dinner is paid for—I urge you to visit Montana—the Nation's Treasure State. We have magnificent mountains and lakes, and great plains, and a lot of Democrats. We do not have an ocean but we do have more ocean-going admirals per capita in the Navy than any other State in the Union.

We are drawn together, tonight, in a political gathering. It honors two of the great historic figures of the National Democratic Party. But, in a sense, it honors all party members—those who are elected and those who work to get them elected. Here in Wilmington, this dinner honors your distinguished Governor, your able Congressman, your outstanding mayor, and the many other Democrats who lead this State in consonance with the great national Democratic tradition.

And this dinner honors all of you Democrats who are in attendance, even if you have to pay for it. For, in all seriousness, in the end there is no Democratic Party here or anywhere else in the sense we know it, unless there are men and women in great numbers who are prepared to give their time, their energy, their devotion, and their money for the cause of decent and honorable and effective government in the United States.

As we meet tonight, when the Nation is at a pinnacle of economic prosperity and the Democratic Party at a pinnacle of political prosperity, I ask you to think of an earlier period. It used to be, not so long ago that many of us cannot remember, that these Jefferson-Jackson dinners were occasions, primarily, for mutual commiseration and reassurance. We knew, or rather we hoped, that someday the people of the Nation would again turn to the Democratic Party for national leadership. That hope was just about all there was to hold the national party together. That period was—as the present era is—an era of great prosperity for the Nation. There was one big difference: It was also an era of Republican Party prosperity. It was 1929. To the Republicans of that time there was not a cloud on the horizon.

And then look what happened. Look what happened to them again in November last year. I ask you not to laugh at the Republican experience but rather to learn from it.

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with mobility limited by the effects of arthritis or accidents. Not included in these numbers are those temporarily "handicapped" with broken legs, sprained ankles, pregnancy, small children or other limitations to their normal mobility.

#### ARCHITECTURAL BARRIERS FACT SHEET

1. Architectural barriers defined: Architectural barriers are any architectural feature which prohibits handicapped persons from entering or using buildings where they may need to go for business, recreation, or civic duty.

2. The Architectural Barriers Project Committee:

The ABPC in Washington is a part of a nationwide attack on architectural barriers sponsored by the National Society for Crippled Children and Adults, and the President's Committee on Employment for the Handicapped. The local committee is sponsored by the District of Columbia Commissioners Committee on Employment of the Handicapped, the District of Columbia Society for Crippled Children, and the Crippled Children's Societies of Prince Georges County and northern Virginia.

#### 3. Activities:

An architectural barriers survey of 1,500 buildings in Metropolitan Washington which are intended for public use has been completed. These include hotels, motels, restaurants, theaters, office buildings, apartments, banks, and shopping centers.

Some of the points surveyed were widths of doors, availability of ramps or level entrances, accessibility of phone booths and drinking fountains to persons in wheelchairs, elevator service, width of stalls in public washrooms, touch marks to guide the blind.

Information was gathered on standard survey forms provided by the national project. Similar surveys are being carried out throughout the country and have been completed in Pittsburgh, Seattle, Cincinnati, San Francisco, Chicago, Boston, New York, and other areas.

A directory of accessible buildings based on the survey and entitled "Guide to Washington for the Handicapped" is available for 25 cents.

Educational work is underway to alert the public to the need for accessible buildings and to contract builders and landlords to interest them in considering the needs of handicapped citizens in their building and remodeling plans.

Architectural standards and specifications have been developed by the national project and are available to builders. New Government buildings must comply with these standards. Cost of incorporating the standards in a new building is insignificant, but remodeling costs are sometimes high.

#### 4. Need for the project and for the survey:

National figures: 139,000 people with artificial limbs; 260,000 blind; 200,000 in heavy leg braces; 5,000 with heart conditions; 250,000 in wheelchairs; 20,000 over 65 who need easier access to buildings.

Locally, based on the general population, 12 percent of the people have limited ability to move around freely. Washington, D.C., population is 2 million therefore, some 240,000 here would benefit by more accessible buildings.

The lack of access is the only factor which prevents many of these from leading useful lives.

#### 5. Interest of Capitol Hill:

February 6, 1962: "Standards for Making Buildings Usable by the Physically Handicapped" inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Reprints are available.

April 8, 1963: "Sites in Washington, D.C., With Facilities for the Handicapped" inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Appendix by Congressman TORBERT MACDONALD.

February 19, 1964: "Campaign To Remove Architectural Barriers for the Handicapped" inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD (Senate p. 3016 and 3017) by Senator Moss, of Utah, the report of the Architectural Barriers Steering Committee, State of Utah.

Year 1965: Several new bills under consideration, dealing with rehabilitation, include reference to the elimination of architectural barriers as they relate to the effectiveness of rehabilitation services.

#### 6. Financing and personnel:

The project committee is entirely a voluntary effort and has no budget whatsoever. Mrs. Allan B. Fay, is chairman of the project committee; Paul O'Donnell is chairman of the survey committee; Dr. Thomas Stein, of Chicago is national director of the project.

Volunteers: The several hundred volunteers who carried out the survey were drawn from such groups as: National Association of the Physically Handicapped, Inc.; Paralyzed Veterans of America; Washington Building Congress; Washington Chapter of American Institute of Architects; Opening Doors; Federation of Citizens Associations; Indoor Sports Club; District of Columbia Department of Vocational Rehabilitation; Multiple Sclerosis Association; Association of Oldest Inhabitants, Junior League.

For information call: Project Headquarters, Mrs. Miller or Mr. Evans, AD 2-2342; call Mrs. Allan B. Fay, project chairman, 652-5397; call Paul O'Donnell, survey chairman, 961-2249 (office), AD 4-1142 home.

### STUDENTS ENACT VITAL EDUCATION BILL

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I have been advised by Jerrold Pesz and Bill Walker, of the University of Houston, that the university's student association senate recently gave unanimous approval to a bill that I regard as most important.

In order that all Senators may be advised of this action, I ask that the text of the bill be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### SENATE BILL NO. 20

A bill to support legislation introduced in the U.S. Senate by Senator ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Democrat of Connecticut, and cosponsored by Senator JOHN TOWER, representative of Texas, providing for income tax credit for college students

Whereas a bill introduced in the U.S. Senate by Senator ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Democrat, of Connecticut, and cosponsored by Senator JOHN TOWER, representative of Texas, provides for an income tax credit of \$1,500 of tuition, fees, books, and supplies for a student at an institution of higher learning; and

Whereas the Student Association of the University of Houston has been asked to support Senator RIBICOFF's bill; and

Whereas this bill would be an effective aid to higher education and would be of benefit to many students and their families: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the University of Houston Student Association

#### ARTICLE I

That the University of Houston Student Association, which represents the students of this university, firmly supports this measure and urges the approval of this bill by the Congress of the United States of America.

#### ARTICLE II

That this bill, with supporting material, be sent to the Representatives and Senators

from Texas, and to the President and Vice President of the United States, urging passage of this bill.

Unanimously passed by the student senate:

RICHARD GACHAGEN,  
President, Student Association.  
WILLIAM YARDLEY,  
Dean of Students.

### SOUTH & EAST DALLAS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OPPOSES REPEAL OF SECTION 14(b) OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY LAW

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the board of directors of the South & East Dallas Chamber of Commerce recently unanimously voted to oppose repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley law.

I fully agree with the chamber's position; and in order that other Senators may judge the views of Texans about this vital matter, I ask that a letter I have received from the chamber be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SOUTH & EAST DALLAS  
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,  
Dallas, Tex., May 20, 1965.

Senator JOHN G. TOWER,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR TOWER: The board of directors of the South & East Dallas Chamber of Commerce has unanimously voted to oppose repeal, amendment, or change in section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act.

We Texans believe in every freedom for all citizens and especially the workingman. The requirement that a worker join or not join a union as a term of his contract with his employer should not be permitted in our State. We have prospered well under the right-to-work law which has been a statute in Texas for more than a decade and we want to continue on this basis.

We therefore urge you to vote against any change in section 14(b) and use your good influence to keep this section as it is presently written in the Taft-Hartley law.

Sincerely,

F. S. OLDY, President.

### ADOLF BERLE SUPPORTS PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MOVES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, an excellent article on the present situation in the Dominican Republic appears in the current—May 20—issue of The Reporter. It is by Adolf A. Berle, former Assistant Secretary of State, and former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil. Obviously, Mr. Berle is extremely knowledgeable on Latin American affairs.

He starts by writing that he "began his career fighting to end Woodrow Wilson's occupation of that country"; and he believes that President Johnson made the right decision.

His experience parallels mine. In 1920, as managing editor of The Nation, I launched an editorial crusade against our gunboat diplomacy in Latin America. It began with an article by Herbert J. Seligman, on "The Conquest of Haiti." This conquest has taken place under strict military censorship by the U.S.

Navy and Marine Corps, during the first administration of Woodrow Wilson. It was wholly contrary to President Wilson's pronouncements about the right of small nations to self-determination.

I first learned of this during the war, while I was a candidate for a commission in the Field Artillery, in Camp Zachary Taylor. One night, in the "Y", I found an item indicating that the U.S. Marines had been bombing Haitian villages from the air. This struck me as such a violation of the Wilsonian pronouncements, that I mentally vowed that I would try to find out what this was all about. My opportunity came after the war, when I became managing editor of the New York weekly, *The Nation*. I sent James Weldon Johnson, who had been a former United States Ambassador to Nicaragua, to Haiti; and he wrote a series of four excellent articles entitled: "Self-Determining Haiti." Lewis S. Gannett wrote an excellent article on our invasion of the Dominican Republic. Much else—editorials and special articles—was printed, including some on the subject of our invasion and occupation of Nicaragua. It should be pointed out that our policies then were dictated by private economic interests of banks and investors in the United States. It was crude "dollar diplomacy," enforced by arms. We should never have pursued such a policy.

I was in correspondence with some of the Senate leaders—William E. Borah, of Idaho; William H. King, of Utah; George W. Norris, of Nebraska; Robert LaFollette, of Wisconsin; and others who shared my views. As a result of my efforts, the Senate appointed a select committee, headed by Medill McCormick, of Illinois, to investigate our occupation of Haiti and Santo Domingo. The chairman asked me to precede the committee and to make arrangements for hearings in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which I did. Although the result was not satisfactory to me, in that the committee whitewashed the Haitian occupation, and recommended its maintenance, it did make plans for the military evacuation of the Dominican Republic. Unfortunately, we left the legacy of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo y Molina, who had been trained in the Marine Corps, and later seized the presidency; and our subsequent recognition of, and assistance to, this tyrant and butcher do not constitute one of the creditable chapters in American foreign policy.

However, I believe that what President Johnson has initiated is in no sense a revival of our gunboat diplomacy. I feel very definitely that his original purpose in evacuating Americans and other nationals was essential, and that his concern lest there be another Castro-Communist takeover in another Caribbean island warranted his action.

Most important of all was his prompt calling on the Organization of American States to come in and assume responsibility as rapidly as possible. If, out of this chaotic situation, an inter-American police force—a multilateral responsibility for situations such as those which have occurred in the Dominican Republic and are likely to occur elsewhere—

will emerge, President Johnson's action will be fully justified. I am not unaware of the great difficulties of having such a program succeed; but the objective is most worthwhile and, indeed, is essential.

Needless to say, I sincerely hope that the reports that in carrying out this mission our policy has been one of leaning toward rightwingers and aiding them militarily, rather than one of neutrality, will prove to be unfounded.

If, in our desire to avoid a Communist takeover, we supported fascist-minded dictators who oppose essential reforms—ah, regrettably, we have done on several occasions, such a policy would foster communism and would defeat our declared purpose. We must be determined not to have that happen.

I ask unanimous consent that Adolf Berle's article, entitled "A Stitch in Time," from the *Reporter* magazine, be printed at this point in my remarks in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### A STITCH IN TIME (By Adolf A. Berle)

On April 28, 1965, after 2 days of painful conferences and consideration, President Lyndon Johnson ordered a detachment of marines to land in the Dominican Republic. The writer, who began his career fighting to end Woodrow Wilson's occupation of that country, believes the President made the right decision.

The President had to act immediately on a telephone report from Ambassador W. Taylor Bennett, Jr., that hundreds of Americans were in danger and strong action was needed to save their lives. In the larger view, he had reports indicating a steady infiltration into the republic of guerrillas trained in Cuba and Czechoslovakia, and of more coming. This was a further move in the continuing Communist campaign of subversion and aggression in the Caribbean. An uprising designed to reinstate Juan Bosch—who was duly elected President of the Dominican Republic in December 1962, but ousted by a military coup in September 1963—had provided the opportunity for a simultaneous rising by organized Communist groups. Within 48 hours the Bosch partisans, seeking democratic government, were infiltrated and then dominated by the trained Communist elements, and many of the Bosch leaders sought refuge in foreign embassies. As the pro-Bosch forces lost control, they opened the army arsenals to the people. Not surprisingly, the Communist groups got most of the arms. Finally Mr. Johnson had to consider the effect of a possible Communist seizure of Santo Domingo in the vast context of Communist aggression from Vietnam to Africa.

I think that the President had little choice. He could have called in the Organization of American States, asked it to go to work, and stopped there. But the OAS has no guns and needs time to decide; meanwhile, events were moving dangerously fast. He could have sat by, praying for the American lives and watching unlimited bloodshed as Dominicans killed each other, then dealing as best he could with the outcome. This would have meant continuation of a fierce civil war, supplied with arms and reinforcements from Cuba. In that case, the President might face a Dominican Republic in the hands of a Castro-style regime established by sheer terror. Or the President could act, creating the situation himself. He elected to act.

The elements he had to work with were not promising. Juan Bosch had been elected in 1962 by some 65 percent of the Dominican voters. His government had received all the support the United States could give. It was acclaimed as a worthy companion to the democratic Governments of Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica. Unhappily, there was little solid party organization behind Bosch. Thirty-one years of Trujillo dictatorship had wiped out practically every vestige of political structure. Bosch himself, honest and idealistic, a well-known Latin American literary figure, found trouble in managing affairs of state. Some of his supporters intrigued with the Communists or with the military. An ill-fated Castro-supported expedition of Dominican leftists and Cuban "volunteers" against Santo Domingo in 1959 had left behind a nucleus, the 14th of June Party, that caused intermittent trouble. Two Communist parties, respectively Russian- and Chinese-oriented, were allowed to function. Castro Communists were also infiltrating some important labor unions.

Some Dominican Army officers and also some civilian elements believed that doors were being opened for a Communist takeover, in which case they would have their throats cut. That fear led Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin and other army chiefs to bring off the coup in September 1963 that sent Bosch into exile. The United States and the democratic governments in the Caribbean protested. For a time, Washington cut off its aid, technical help, and other assistance.

The generals, however, did not follow the usual pattern. Declining to form a military government, they installed a civilian triumvirate that last year gave way to the regime of the former foreign minister Donald Reid Cabral. His brother had been murdered by Trujillo; he himself had been imprisoned. He is the son of a Scot and a Dominican mother. Though Reid Cabral's regime was illegitimate, the American Embassy came to respect him. He was moving toward reestablishment of "legitimacy"—that is, the holding of elections scheduled for September. Cautiously, the U.S. Government was moving to sustain his hand. He endeavored to bring order out of administrative chaos, to pull together the Dominican economy, and to bring the army under civilian control. Many army officers disliked this. Some were pro-Bosch; others perhaps had played with the Communist agents. At all events, these elements planned an uprising, scheduled for June 1, to bring back Juan Bosch. Discovery of this plan forced action on April 25. The officers' revolt simultaneously, and apparently unintentionally, cleared the way for the armed emergence of the Communist guerrillas.

#### MAKING OUR STAND CLEAR

Meanwhile, the Caribbean situation assumed importance on the worldwide stage. Former President Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela insists that in Latin America the Communist factions linked to Moscow and Peking still work together. They cooperate in any action that may make trouble for the United States and in working to overthrow non-Communist governments. They had been unsuccessful in Venezuela, Brazil, and other countries, but they still have small units in armed revolt in Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala. Their technique of infiltrating genuine democratic movements and later seizing them has proved successful, as when Castro concealed his Communist affiliations until he had taken over. The probability has to be faced that the Communist Frente de Liberación Nacional in Venezuela, the "violence areas" in Colombia, and the dissolved Guatemalan Communist Party will all become actively terrorist.

The myth had grown up in Communist circles that the United States cannot act in Latin America. American doctrine does indeed prohibit intervention. Too often



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that has been interpreted to keep Latin-American rebellions armed, organized, financed, and directed in other countries from being recognized as the external attacks they really are. American doctrine does consider an attack on any American state as an attack on all, giving rise to the right of defense.

The time had come to make several things clear if the whole Caribbean was not to erupt.

That the United States would no longer be immobilized by the fiction that externally armed uprisings were merely local movements for reform.

That "nonintervention" in the internal affairs of a country does not prevent the United States from defending a country attacked from outside—despite the camouflage of "internal revolution."

That further attacks of the Castro variety cannot count on immunity from American force on a scale adequate to meet the contingency.

That the United States cannot afford another Cuba—particularly not in the Caribbean. The President's action made this clear—to Latin America, to Peiping, and to Moscow.

"Adverse Latin American opinion" was urged as an argument against action. Actually, Latin America expects the United States to act and does not respect us much when we fail to do so. Argentina and Brazil promptly approved President Johnson's action. Costa Rica reportedly offered "freedom fighters." The Council of the Organization of American States sent a peace-mediating commission; it arrived in Santo Domingo on May 2. The protest has not developed to the extent feared. Until Latin American governments are willing to give the OAS the forces and capacity to defend weak countries, the United States offers those governments their only effective defense, and they know it. Both before and after the Bay of Pigs affair, when the OAS was paralyzed by indecision, many Latin American diplomats said to me they thought the United States should act first and discuss later. Officially they may decry our action, but they want the power vacuum filled.

President Johnson has filled it. He will have many problems as a result. They are, I believe, less dangerous than the problems he would have faced had he stood aside. No one forgets that failure to take decisive action against Castro in 1961 brought us to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union in 1962.

If the President had not acted, what would have been the outcome? No one will ever know. The rebels might have restored the Bosch regime, though this seems unlikely. The Dominican Army might have produced a dictator, perhaps a new Trujillo. The Communist groups might have seized the government, making a new Cuba. They might have taken to the hills, opening a new chapter of guerrilla bloodshed against either the forces of Wessin y Wessin or of a democratic Bosch regime. The least dangerous course for the President was to take the initiative and dominate events.

#### SENATORS ALLOTT AND FANNIN PROTEST FEATURES OF ADMINISTRATION FIREARMS BILL

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, last week the Senate Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee, on which I serve, began its hearings on S. 1592. This is the bill sponsored by President Johnson which would ban the interstate shipment of firearms to individuals, greatly increase the fees for manufacturing and selling firearms and ammunition, and curb the importation of surplus foreign firearms.

In reviewing the testimony presented to the subcommittee, I was particularly impressed by the statements of two of our colleagues, the senior Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT] and the junior Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN].

Senator ALLOTT documents how passage of S. 1592 would work a hardship on many responsible citizens of his State and of many other States in certain sections of this country, including my own State of Nebraska. The Senator from Colorado makes it clear that he recognizes there is a problem in keeping guns out of the hands of the irresponsible element of our society and that the Federal Government has a legitimate contribution to make in the solution of that problem. In this connection Senator ALLOTT is listed as a cosponsor of S. 14, which would prevent convicted felons, juveniles, and fugitives from justice from purchasing firearms by mail.

The Senator from Colorado makes good sense when he argues that the answer does not lie in, as he puts it, "cutting off the head to cure the headache" but rather in an approach which would prevent the acquisition of arms by those who, according to the statistics of the subcommittee, are most likely to use them in crimes of violence.

Senator FANNIN points out that there are many small businesses in his State and throughout the country such as the custom shops that produce fine sporting and target arms for mail-order sale that would suffer severely under the bill. Senator FANNIN shares the view of Senator ALLOTT that the proposed increased license fee for selling ammunition would cause the rural general store and gas stations in his State and throughout the West to cease carrying sporting ammunition for their customers. This would be a great hardship on the farmers, ranchers and sportsmen who live in the sparsely populated areas of our Western States.

I ask unanimous consent that Senator ALLOTT's and Senator FANNIN's statements of last Friday be printed in the RECORD, and I urge Senators to give attention and consideration to the pertinent points made by our colleagues.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR GORDON ALLOTT BEFORE SENATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY SUBCOMMITTEE, MAY 20, 1965

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear and be heard today on S. 1592, to amend the Federal Firearms Act. I would like, at the outset, to express my concern that this subject not be acted upon in an emotional manner, nor in haste, perhaps as the result of a shocking incident which still is fresh in all of our minds. For these reasons, particularly, I am pleased to be able to appear here and to note that this committee obviously intends to conduct full hearings and give this bill the deliberation which it merits.

Members of the committee certainly are familiar with President Johnson's message to the Congress expressing his concern about crime and its prevention. As a part of that message, the President called for regulations on interstate shipment of guns and declared the right of citizens to be secure on the streets, and in their homes and places of business.

I certainly agree with the broad outlines of that message and, as a matter of fact, I had joined you, Mr. Chairman, in sponsoring your bill, S. 14, which was designed to help the States cope with the problem of firearms shipped interstate in derogation of the laws of the individual States. As you know, I had studied that bill, I had recognized that a problem does exist, and I had concluded that your earlier bill was a reasonable and effective piece of legislation.

But, it seems to me that there is a basic difference in philosophy between the bill which I was pleased to cosponsor, S. 14, and the bill which is before you today. I believe that the basic philosophy expressed in S. 1592 is that guns are somehow bad per se and must be heavily regulated. With this philosophy, I cannot agree. The word "guns" is not a four-letter, Anglo-Saxon word with dirty connotations, as some seem to think, and putting the epithet "mail order" with it still does not make it unclean.

It has been hammered home that Lee Harvey Oswald used a mail-order gun in committing his heinous crime. So far as I know, however, it has not been generally recognized that Lee Oswald could have walked into any one of several sporting goods stores in Dallas and purchased a rifle of the same quality across the counter and he would not have violated any law in doing so. That gun from a sporting goods store would have been surely just as deadly as the mail-order weapon he used. Further, Jack Ruby, I am informed, used a Smith & Wesson .38 for which he had a permit. Yet, little has been said about the deadliness of a weapon carried by an individual who has a license from the local police authorities to carry that weapon. The point I want to make is that neither firearm nor mail-order firearms by themselves are bad. It is for this reason that I have asked for due deliberation and, insofar as possible, objectivity in approaching this question.

Perhaps we of the West are more familiar with firearms and therefore fear them less, recognizing that it is the abuse of the weapon that is the real problem. There are legitimate uses and legitimate users and I strongly feel that we must not unduly hinder these legitimate uses in attempting to curb the abuses.

S. 1592 may, perhaps, accept as legitimate the sporting use of firearms. It seems to me, however, that the bill rejects self-defense as a legitimate use, but in rejecting this it rejects half of President Johnson's declaration.

An instance of the type of thing I had in mind occurred very close to home just last year. A young lady from Brighton, Colo., employed in my office, owns a hand gun and knows how to use it. She was taught by her father and I can testify that she uses it well and properly. About a year ago she was awakened at 5 in the morning by a noise in her apartment. It subsequently turned out that there was a prowler there. The young lady lives alone and her only real means of protection against lawless elements is the gun, which she brought with her from Colorado and keeps in her apartment here in Washington. With that gun she was able to subdue the housebreaker and hold him until the police arrived and could take charge. The man involved has pleaded guilty and is awaiting sentencing, but I have often wondered what I would have had to tell that girl's parents if she had not had the gun. We are all proud of Joyce Morgan in our office and I take pleasure in recognizing her today. This, gentlemen, is an example of a legitimate use of a weapon.

The Attorney General says this measure is "not intended to curtail the ownership of guns among those legally entitled to own them. It is not intended to deprive people of guns used either for sport or for self-protection. It is not intended to force regulation on unwilling States \* \* \*. The purpose of this measure is simple: it is, merely, to

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help the States protect themselves against the unchecked flood of mail-order weapons to residents whose purposes might not be responsible, or even lawful. S. 1592 would provide such assistance to the extent that the States and the people of the States want it."

That is certainly not the way I read the bill. The flat prohibition on the shipment of firearms in interstate commerce, coupled with the severe limitations placed on acquisition of hand guns, particularly, seem to me a clear demonstration of an intent to make it difficult, if not impossible, for the ordinary citizen to acquire a pistol.

To be more specific, section 2(a)(2) would prohibit an individual from acquiring or disposing of a pistol or revolver while he was traveling in interstate or foreign commerce. Incidentally, this section would transform any violation of State law concerning the transportation of a hand gun into a Federal offense. Let me give a specific example of what the prohibition on acquisition or disposition may mean. I own a hand gun which I brought with me from Colorado. My legal residence, of course, is Colorado. Am I, while engaged in my duties as a U.S. Senator in Washington, D.C., traveling in interstate commerce? If I am, and if I decide to sell or in any manner dispose of my gun, presumably I cannot legally do it outside of Colorado. If this bill becomes law and I find the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury burdensome, I nevertheless must find some way to get that gun back to Colorado before I can legally dispose of it.

Or, presume a person who does not own a hand gun becomes disturbed enough by the crime statistics in Washington, D.C., that he decides to purchase a gun for the protection of himself and his family. After this bill becomes law, as I read the bill, he may not legally be able to acquire that gun here, but would have to return to his home State, purchase one, and then face the problem of legally transporting it here through each State through which he might pass to arrive here.

Another perfectly legitimate use of guns is target shooting, and meets are held all over the United States. Although I have not attended one in recent years, I know that it used to be quite usual for gun enthusiasts to trade not only long guns but hand guns at these meets. If a person attending such a meet has come in from outside that State, may he legally trade with another sportsman? Under the bill as it now stands, I think not. The prohibition is on "sale or other disposition thereof," and on acquisition (2(a)(2) A and B).

Presumably, guns may be shipped by common carrier intrastate under this bill. I would point out to the committee that there are many remote areas in my own State which are not serviced by common carrier. Hand guns, of course, are nonmailable except to manufacturers or dealers. Add to this the prohibition in section 2(b)(3) against sales of hand guns to nonresidents of the State where the dealer is located, and it seems obvious to me that we would make it as a practical matter very difficult for a rancher in eastern Colorado to acquire a pistol. There are areas in my State from which the residents customarily cross State lines and go into Nebraska or Kansas, Wyoming, Utah or New Mexico to do their shopping. This law would be a real imposition on the good citizens of these areas, who have legitimate need for such guns.

The high cost of licenses proposed for dealers under S. 1592 is, of course, designed to, and I believe will, stamp out the carrying of guns and ammunition in stock by small stores. It will lead to further concentration of the industry in a few sources, and these sources would presumably be located in the metropolitan areas. This is simply one further facet of the hardship imposed on the

people who live in rural areas, or small communities. I do not happen to know whether Walden, Colo., for example, now has a gun dealer in town, but I do know that the cost of a license proposed under S. 1592 is likely to make it economically infeasible for any store in Walden to purchase such a license, and people from that area will then have a long way to go to purchase even ammunition.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, antiques and unserviceable firearms are exceptions to the Federal Firearms Act. I do not know how many collectors of such firearms there may be in this country, but it is, I believe, a legitimate hobby. An exception is made in S. 1592 for such guns only in the provisions relating to importation. Obviously, S. 1592 is going to work a hardship on the collector, particularly if he wants to acquire as a part of his collection pistols or revolvers, even if those guns cannot possibly be fired. Apparently, the only route of acquisition open to him if he wants a gun presently owned by an individual in another State is to find a licensed dealer who will handle the transportation, thereby presumably adding to the cost of acquisition (sec. 2(a)(4)).

Another exception in the present law, which is dropped from S. 1592, is that for banks, public carriers, and armored car companies and although governmental agencies are excepted generally from the provision of the bill, the "duly commissioned officer or agent" who is exempted under the act now in effect, would be blanketed in under S. 1592. I see no valid reason for dropping these exceptions from the operation of the law, if we start from a premise that there are legitimate uses and legitimate users of firearms.

My mail, Mr. Chairman, has reflected concern over the wide discretion allowed the Secretary of the Treasury in this measure. I will mention only two facets of this which particularly bother me. Section 3(c)(2), which directs the Secretary to disapprove an application for a license if the applicant is not likely to maintain operations in compliance with the act "by reason of his business experience, financial standing, or trade connection," seems to me to be such an unnecessarily broad grant of discretion to the Secretary as to preclude any reasonable hope of reversing the Secretary's decision, thereby vesting final authority in an executive officer contrary to our accepted philosophies and procedures. Such discretion reminds me of the words of Lewis Carroll, the eminent author of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland: "I'll be judge, I'll be jury," said cunning old Fury, "I'll try the whole cause, and condemn you to death."

Under the importation provisions of the bill, section 3(e)(3), allows the Secretary—I note that it does not direct him—to authorize importation of a firearm which "is of a type and quality generally recognized as particularly suitable for lawful sporting purposes and is not a surplus military weapon and that the importation or bringing in of the firearm would not be contrary to the public interest." I would simply point out to the committee that aside from the difficulty which will arise in interpreting this language, and thus again, a broad discretion vested in the Secretary, there are many types of surplus military weapons which may be suitable for lawful sporting purposes or which may be readily converted to sports weapons. The British Enfield would be a good example of such a weapon and, in fact, I believe all Mausers are highly regarded by sportsmen and could fit the definition of "particularly suitable for lawful sporting purposes." In the category of handguns, the Luger would also fall into this class. Is there any real reason to put a blanket prohibition on importation of military weapons, or was this perhaps an emotional reaction to a specific incident?

Also, on the import provisions of the bill,

I might mention that it appears from Director Margrave's statement that there is presently sufficient authority under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 to prohibit all importation of arms and ammunition, including those items called "destructive devices" in S. 1592. In view of this present authority, I would urge the Committee to explore the enforcement of present law, and whether this may be strengthened, rather than create new legislation in this field.

Mr. Chairman, I commenced my statement with a plea for objectivity. As a co-sponsor of S. 14, I believe I have recognized that there is a problem and that the Federal Government has a legitimate contribution to make in the solution of that problem. I have stated before, however, that I believe S. 1592 is not the proper solution and that with all deference to the chairman, this bill is not well drawn.

Again, there is a problem, but the solution is not to be found in depriving legitimate users of firearms of their liberty to acquire and use them. I believe that S. 1592 would cut off the head to cure the headache and, while I, too, am concerned about the threat posed by guns in the hands of irresponsible elements, I would say to the committee, and to Senators, as Ben Franklin said: "Those, who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety."

STATEMENT BY SENATOR PAUL J. FANNIN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARING ON S. 1592, FIREARMS CONTROL LEGISLATION, FRIDAY, MAY 21, 1965

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my appearance here today is on behalf of the many individuals and organizations in my State of Arizona who are opposed to S. 1592. I realize that many witnesses want to testify on this important legislation and I want to thank the chairman for granting me the privilege to make a brief statement.

In the interest of conserving time, Mr. Chairman, I ask permission to have two prepared statements included in the Record following my remarks. One is Senate Memorial No. 1 of the 27th Arizona Legislature, adopted unanimously by the Arizona State Senate and approved by the Governor on May 14, 1965. The other is a statement submitted on behalf of the Arizona State rifle and pistol association by its president Dr. Leonard Brewster, of Tucson; and the Secretary, Mr. Ben Avery, of Phoenix. Both statements present logical and factual arguments in opposition to S. 1592, and in addition, I believe they are an accurate reflection of majority opinion in my State.

This is borne out by the volume of letters and telegrams I have received from Arizona citizens. Very few have indicated support for the bill, while a substantial number have expressed strong opposition to it.

All of us, I'm sure, share the conviction that an effective attack must be mounted against the rising crime rate in this country. But the regulations embodied in S. 1592 would not prevent the determined criminal from obtaining firearms; instead, it would impose severe penalties on millions of honest, law-abiding citizens.

There are many small businesses in my State and throughout the country which would suffer severely under this bill. Many of these are small custom shops that produce fine sporting and target arms for mail-order sale all over the world.

In addition to these small dealers, there are many sparsely populated areas of Arizona where service stations and small general stores handle firearms and ammunition as an accommodation to the ranchers and farmers who need them.

They also serve the more than 150,000 Arizonans who engage in hunting and whose

David Lee Bogue shall have the same citizenship status as that which existed immediately prior to its loss.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

#### MING CHUP CHAW

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 584) for the relief of Ming Chop Chaw, which had been reported from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment, in line 4, after the name "Chup", to strike out "Chaw" and insert "Chau"; so as to make the bill read:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That, in the administration of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Ming Chup Chau shall be held and considered to be under twenty-one years of age.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

The title was amended, so as to read: "A bill for the relief of Ming Chup Chau."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, that concludes the call of the calendar. I express my deepest thanks to the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd] and to the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Prouty] for their patience.

#### OFFICIAL ADOPTION BY BRITISH OF METRIC SYSTEM OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I hail the action of the British Government in officially adopting the metric system of weights and measures, announced in the House of Commons today by the President of the British Board of Trade.

The United States finds itself in the odd position of having inherited our anachronistic system of quarts, pounds, and inches from the British, only to find that the parent of the system has recognized its impracticability and is moving over to the metric system. This leaves us virtually alone in the world in our insistence upon our system of weights and measures, which originated in medieval times.

I suggest that we get on with the business at hand and initiate a study of the feasibility of adopting the metric system in this country—a proposal that Representative GEORGE P. MILLER and I have been pressing for several years.

#### THE DOMINICAN CRISIS

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in deciding to send the marines into the Dominican Republic, for the purpose of preventing the emergence of a second Castro regime in the Americas, President Johnson took one of the most difficult and courageous decisions ever taken by an American President.

The President must have known that the decision would result in a storm of protest and criticism, some of it uninformed, some of it calculated and malicious.

He was aware, I am certain, that he would be accused of acting unilaterally rather than acting through the OAS, as the United States is obligated to do in such matters.

He was also aware that he would be accused of intervening on behalf of a tyrannical military dictatorship against what claims to be a popular proconstitutional revolution.

He was also aware that the Communist propaganda apparatus would exploit the situation to the utmost in renewed attacks on the theme of American imperialism.

A less courageous President would have hesitated before embarking upon an action which would bring the critics swarming like hornets about his head.

I am afraid, indeed, that there is more than one President in American history who would have put off acting, even confronted with serious evidence of an imminent Communist takeover.

It is to President Johnson's eternal credit that he placed the security of the Nation and of freedom in this hemisphere before every other consideration.

A Castro regime in the Dominican Republic would not merely have been a tragedy for the Dominican people.

It would have constituted an immediate menace to the political stability and security of every Latin American nation and to the freedoms of the Latin American peoples.

I do not see how anyone who stops to seriously assess the human and political consequences of a second Castro regime in the Americas could fail to agree with the President's determination that the establishment of such a regime is something the United States cannot under any circumstances tolerate.

#### DEMOCRACY VERSUS DICTATORSHIP: FACT OR FALLACY?

There has been a tendency on the part of some writers to oversimplify the situation in the Dominican Republic and overidealize the rebel movement. Their articles suggest that they truly believe that what is involved in the Dominican Republic is a conflict between dictatorship and constitutional democracy.

Regrettably there is no such clear-cut choice.

Stability and democracy do not return instantly or easily to a country which has lived for decades under totalitarian one-man rule. And the sad fact is that at the point of liberation from the Trujillo dictatorship, virtually all the things that are essential to the successful practice of democracy were lacking in the Dominican Republic.

There were no tested political leaders, trained in the ways of democracy.

There was a terrible dearth of responsible editors and newspapermen.

There was no broad popular experience with the machinery of democracy.

Above all, there were no knights in shining armor to be found on any side—among the military, among the political conservatives, among the so-called political progressives.

The government of Juan Bosch, in addition to being impossibly inefficient, was far from being the paragon of democracy that some of its supporters now pretend

it was. There were numerous dictatorial actions and threats against the press, which led Dominican publishers and editors to file formal complaints with the Inter-American Press Association. There was, moreover, a serious infiltration of known Communist elements into his government.

The military junta under Gen. Wessin y Wessin, which overthrew Bosch in September 1963, resulted in an infinitely better administration under the civilian triumvirate which it installed, and then under the government of Donald Reid Cabral.

Some articles which appeared in the American press have fostered the impression that the revolt was directed against a ruthless military dictatorship, a kind of reincarnation of the Trujillo regime. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The Cabral regime may not have been constitutional. But Cabral was not a Trujillo. Indeed, his brother had been murdered by Trujillo and he himself had been imprisoned by the Dominican dictator.

According to a recent article by Mr. Adolf A. Berle, former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Cabral—I quote—"endeavored to bring order out of administrative chaos, to pull together the Dominican economy, and to bring the army under civilian control."

Mr. Berle further pointed out that Cabral was moving toward the reestablishment of legitimacy and that he had scheduled elections for this coming September. And he said that as a result of all this, the American Embassy had come to respect Cabral in the period before his downfall.

I believe this estimate of the Cabral government is all the more significant because, Mr. Berle, in addition to possessing unsurpassed knowledge and experience in Latin American affairs, is a man of impeccable liberal credentials and a lifelong friend of the so-called "liberal left" in Latin American politics.

This, then, was the government against which the Bosch forces and the Communist forces and certain misguided army officers, acted in unison on April 24.

I think it important to note the striking similarity between the situation in Cuba at the time of the Castro takeover and the situation in the Dominican Republic today.

In Cuba the Castro revolution was ostensibly directed against Batista. It is generally forgotten that Batista had already agreed to step down, that Rivera-Aguerra had been elected President in elections which had been held in September 1958, and that, if it had not been for Castro's seizure of power in late December 1958 Batista would have departed and Aguerra would have been sworn in as President on January 28.

Similarly, the Dominican revolution of April 24 was directed not against a government of military dictatorship, but against a civilian government which was doing its level best to reduce the role of the military; not against a government which was ruling by increasingly draconian measures, but against a govern-

ment that was seeking to return to democratic rule and had scheduled elections for this coming September.

There is another parallel that I believe deserves noting. Both the Bosch elements and the Communists in the Dominican Republic made the return to constitutionalism the prime plank in their platform. In Cuba, Castro also committed himself to the return to constitutionalism.

The American people have traditionally looked upon their Constitution as something almost sacrosanct. Indeed, I think it would be no exaggeration to state that we are probably the most constitutionally minded people in the world. It is perhaps because of the deeply rooted attachment to our own Constitution that certain American correspondents have been taken in by the cry of "constitutionalism" in the Dominican Republic. Certainly their articles convey the impression that they are inclined to regard the so-called government headed by Colonel Caamaño as "constitutional," and therefore good and democratic, while they regard the military junta headed by Brigadier General Imbert as "unconstitutional," and therefore bad and undemocratic.

There are no paragons and no giants in the military junta, and I would not attempt its defense in these terms. But I challenge the hypothesis that all those on the side of the junta are, ipso facto, completely bad, while all those on the side of Bosch and Caamaño are, ipso facto, good.

There could be no more fatal oversimplification of the Dominican situation than to seek to understand it in terms of a division between "good guys" and "bad guys," between "constitutionalists" and "anticonstitutionalists."

This oversimplification had led some critics of the administration policy into a preposterous position.

On the one hand, they oppose General Imbert because he is a soldier; on the other hand, they support Colonel Caamaño despite the fact that he is also a soldier.

They oppose Imbert because Imbert is anti-Bosch; but they drool over Caamaño as a pro-Bosch leader ignoring the fact that he played a key role in the coup which displaced Bosch and that Bosch, in his memoirs, denounced him vigorously.

To justify their support of Caamaño as a constitutionalist and therefore a democrat, they have uncritically repeated all the charges made by the rebels against the Cabral government; but in doing so they ignore the fact that Caamaño was an officer under Trujillo, while Cabral went to prison under Trujillo.

They are all for Caamaño because he purportedly represents the constitution. But in their enthusiasm they conveniently close their eyes to the fact that Caamaño's appointment as President violated the constitution on two counts.

First, the constitution states flatly that the President cannot be a military man. Second, it requires that the President be a member of the majority party—which Caamaño is not.

They accept Caamaño's protestations that he is anti-Communist and that

there are no Communists in his movement; but they gloss over the hard evidence of mysterious foreign figures in the Caamaño set-up and of known Communist cadres in command positions among his forces.

They are for progressive, orderly, efficient government, which they identify with constitutionalism. But they seem oblivious to the fact that the Bosch government was, by common consent, one of the most monumentally inept and inefficient governments that ever existed in this hemisphere, while the military junta and the Reid to democratic rule and had scheduled elections for this coming September.

There is another parallel that I believe deserves noting. Both the Bosch elements and the Communists in the Dominican Republic made the return to constitutionalism the prime plank in their platform. In Cuba, Castro also committed himself to the return to constitutionalism.

The American people have traditionally looked upon their Constitution as something almost sacrosanct. Indeed, I think it would be no exaggeration to state that we are probably the most constitutionally minded people in the world. It is perhaps because of the deeply rooted attachment to our own Constitution that certain American correspondents have been taken in by the cry of "constitutionalism" in the Dominican Republic. Certainly their articles convey the impression that they are inclined to regard the so-called government headed by Colonel Caamaño as "constitutional," and therefore good and democratic, while they regard the military junta headed by Brigadier General Imbert as "unconstitutional," and therefore bad and undemocratic.

There are no paragons and no giants in the military junta, and I would not attempt its defense in these terms. But I challenge the hypothesis that all those on the side of the junta are, ipso facto, completely bad, while all those on the side of Bosch and Caamaño are, ipso facto, good.

There could be no more fatal oversimplification of the Dominican situation than to seek to understand it in terms of a division between "good guys" and "bad guys," between "constitutionalists" and "anticonstitutionalists."

This oversimplification had led some critics of the administration policy into a preposterous position.

On the one hand, they oppose General Imbert because he is a soldier; on the other hand, they support Colonel Caamaño despite the fact that he is also a soldier.

They oppose Imbert because Imbert is anti-Bosch; but they drool over Caamaño as a pro-Bosch leader ignoring the fact that he played a key role in the coup which displaced Bosch and that Bosch, in his memoirs, denounced him vigorously.

To justify their support of Caamaño as a constitutionalist and therefore a democrat, they have uncritically repeated all the charges made by the rebels against the Cabral government; but in doing so they ignore the fact that Caamaño was

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They are for progressive, orderly, efficient government, which they identify with constitutionalism. But they seem oblivious to the fact that the Bosch government was, by common consent, one of the most monumentally inept and inefficient governments that ever existed in this hemisphere, while the military junta and the Reid Cabral regime at least governed half efficiently and did something to improve the lot of their people.

I come back to the point that this is not a situation which can be understood in terms of "good guys" versus "bad guys" or constitutionalism versus anticonstitutionalism.

In general, the great majority of Americans are for democracy and for constitutional government everywhere.

In general, too, they do not like military coups or rule by military juntas.

But it would be folly to convert these completely valid general attitudes into fetishes, into rules of conduct from which there must never be any deviation.

We must recognize the fact that there are countries that are not yet prepared for democracy in the Western sense, countries for which autocratic government is still as natural as it was for the Kingdom of Israel in the days of King David and Solomon.

We must further recognize the fact that there are other countries where a temporary suspension of constitutional rule has been the only alternative to complete chaos and the installation of a Communist dictatorship which would permanently negate all constitutionality.

This was so in Guatemala in 1954, when the Arbenz regime was using the facade of democracy and legitimacy for the purpose of imposing communism, and when the country was saved at the last minute by a small band of determined men under the leadership of Col. Castillo Armas.

There were those who had doubts about our support of Castillo Armas at the time, just as there are those who have doubts about our intervention to prevent a rebel takeover in the Dominican Republic. The doubters on both issues would do well to consider the fact that Mr. Arbenz, the supposedly constitutional and non-Communist President of Guatemala, has been living in Castro's Cuba ever since 1959.



We were confronted with the same hard choice in Brazil in April 1964, under the nominally constitutional government of Juan Goulart. Brazil, too, was saved at the last minute by a popular revolt spearheaded by the military.

And from all the evidence, there is serious reason for believing that the Americas were confronted with a similar situation in the fall of 1963, when the Dominican military intervened to depose Bosch.

As much as we may regret the need, under any circumstances, to resort to unconstitutional government, it is essential to realize that a number of the governments installed as a result of military coups have been efficient and socially progressive, and that they have, after a period of time, moved back in the direction of democracy and legitimacy.

From the totalitarian political dictatorship of communism, once it is imposed, on the other hand, there is no escape and no reprieve.

Although we cannot reconstruct the past, we can learn from it.

I feel strongly that it would have been an act of wisdom and mercy from the standpoint of the welfare of the Dominican people, if it had been possible to install a provisional OAS government to rule for a period of at least 1 year after the downfall of Trujillo.

And although there will be some who protest that this is undemocratic, I would strongly favor the installation of such a caretaker government by the OAS at this juncture.

If, for reasons of practical politics, a 1-year provisional government by the OAS should prove impossible, then the only alternative, it seems to me, is some kind of mixture of military and civilian rule by a provisional Dominican Government, until conditions can be stabilized sufficiently to permit free elections.

#### WHY THE PRESIDENT ACTED

The question of why the President acted as he did has, I believe, been amply answered by the President himself and by Ambassador Stevenson and by other spokesmen for the administration.

The hard fact is that, by the time the first American marines landed in the Dominican Republic, Communist elements and elements whom we have every reason to suspect of being Communist, had taken over effective control of the Dominican revolution.

As Haynes Johnson reported in the Washington Evening Star, Latin American diplomats stationed in Santo Domingo, even though they would not say so for publication, felt that President Johnson had taken the only possible action open to him and that he had acted literally with hours to spare.

From other sources of information, inside Latin America and outside, I am convinced that Haynes Johnson reported accurately on the attitude of the Latin American diplomats in Santo Domingo, and, I am convinced further that this was the attitude of the great majority of the Latin American governments, despite all the noise about American intervention.

The fact that there were only hours in which to act is, I think, the best and only answer to those who have argued that we should have endeavored to act through the OAS.

The OAS is, unfortunately, not set up for this kind of lightning reaction.

Had the matter been referred to the OAS, the chances are that the discussions would have dragged on for weeks and months, while a neo-Castro regime firmly established itself in the Dominican Republic.

#### FIFTY-FOUR COMMUNISTS—NO PROOF OF DOMINATION?

The New York Times and some other papers have argued that the administration has failed to submit conclusive proof that the rebel movement was Communist dominated.

It has been said that 54 identifiable Communists is not proof of domination, that there are bound to be this many Communists or more in any popular movement in the Americas.

I would like to remind my colleagues of our experience with Castro and Cuba, because it is only against this background that the President's intervention can be intelligently assessed.

When Castro and his band of rebels were in the Sierra Maestra mountains, concentrating on acts of terrorism and sabotage in their bid for political power, Castro was visited by several American correspondents.

Most prominent among these were Mr. Herbert Matthews of the New York Times and Mr. Robert Taber of CBS.

Mr. Taber produced a half-hour TV documentary on the Castro movement which portrayed it in a decidedly favorable and indeed heroic light.

I believe that this documentary and the general newscasting that resulted from it did much to create the condition of gullibility that made the American people, for a period of time, regard Castro as a latter-day version of Simon Bolivar, the great Latin American liberator.

Mr. Taber later emerged as the chief organizer and secretary of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, an organization which, according to evidence given to the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, was launched with the help of Castro funds.

The subcommittee's hearings also revealed that Mr. Taber had a felony record which included convictions for armed robbery and kidnaping, and that, after Castro had come to power, he had traveled to Czechoslovakia for some mysterious purpose on a Cuban passport.

So much for Mr. Robert Taber, author of the CBS documentary on Fidel Castro.

But even more damaging in terms of its total impact were the writings of Mr. Herbert Matthews of the New York Times, whose romantic attitude toward Castro led him to describe the Cuban tyrant as a cross between Thomas Jefferson and Robin Hood.

The New York Times has over the decades come to be regarded as one of the world's foremost newspapers, if not the foremost. This is a reputation it richly merits. In the quality of its jour-

nalism, in the scope of its coverage, in its open-minded approach to the problems of our society, I can think of no other paper that compares with it.

But the New York Times, like all other human institutions, is fallible; and its correspondents and editors, like all ordinary mortals, sometimes become involved in errors of judgment.

Moreover, the quality of correspondents and editors is bound to vary considerably. Some correspondents are fanatics for thoroughness and objectivity; others are less assiduous, more subjective, more inclined to stretch a point in favor of the headline. Some are more astute, more balanced, more mature. Others are less astute, less balanced, less mature.

That is why the quality of the coverage will vary from one situation to another.

As understandable as these variations may be, it is nevertheless a tragedy for all of us whenever a Times correspondent goes completely astray in his estimates or his judgments.

The influence of the New York Times on a national level cannot be overestimated. It is read by every Member of Congress, by every member of the administration, and, in much of the country, by virtually every member of the clergy and of university faculties and by others who participate in the general task of forming public opinion.

In addition, there is an understandable tendency, even in the newspaper profession, to regard the New York Times as gospel. I have heard from more than one competent correspondent that when they sent in dispatches from foreign countries that contradicted or conflicted with the dispatches being printed by the New York Times, their editors would immediately react by becoming worried and difficult.

"Surely, the New York Times cannot be completely wrong," they would say to their correspondents—thereby implying that their own correspondents must somehow be in error.

Because of the universal respect the Times enjoys, Matthews' misleading reports on the Castro movement did widespread damage.

Long after Castro came to power, when evidence concerning his Communist activities became available in an increasing volume, Herbert Matthews clung to his conviction that Castro was not a Communist.

On July 14, 1959, Maj. Pedro Diaz Lanz, former chief of Castro's Air Force, told the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security that Castro was trying to convert Cuba into a "tool of Russia."

The subcommittee at the time it took this testimony, already had substantial evidence on hand from other sources that Castro was himself a Communist and that his movement was Communist-dominated.

Twenty-four hours later, Herbert L. Matthews, of the New York Times, filed a dispatch from Havana from which I quote:

This is not a Communist revolution in any sense of the word and there are no Communists in positions of control \* \* \* The ac-

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cusations of Maj. Pedro Diaz Lanz before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee yesterday are rejected by virtually all Cubans. \* \* \* The only power worth considering in Cuba today is in the hands of Premier Castro, who is not only not Communist, but decidedly anti-Communist.

Regrettably, there were many people, both in government and out, who continued to "give Castro the benefit of the doubt," some for another year, some for almost 2 years.

Mr. Matthews' exceeding reluctance to describe anyone as a Communist seems to have communicated itself on a number of issues to the editorial columns of the Times, either because he himself wrote the editorials or because of his personal influence.

On July 17, 1961, in a speech on the floor of the Senate, I warned that the election of Dr. Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana might give us another Communist-dominated government in the Americas. On August 23, the New York Times commented editorially:

Dr. Jagan has been labeled by some high American officials and some Senators as a Communist, or the equivalent of one. If this were to prove the official U.S. Government attitude, Dr. Jagan and his government would certainly be in the communistic camp alongside of Cuba very soon. If British Guiana is handled by the United States with some understanding, sophistication, and sympathy, there is every reason to hope it will become a desirable member of the Inter-American system.

Fortunately, the Department of State did not follow the advice of this editorial and today British Guiana is no longer ruled by Jagan.

It would be bad enough if Mr. Matthews did not learn from his own errors. It must be stated with regret that the New York Times apparently has not yet evaluated Mr. Matthews' oft-punctured romanticizing on the subject of Latin American Communists.

Against the background of his dismally misleading performance in Cuba, I find it ironical in the extreme that Mr. Herbert Matthews should again have undertaken, in an article in the May 10 edition of the Times, to lecture the President and Congress and the American people on the noncommunism of the Dominican revolution and on the wickedness of American intervention.

To those who say that the presence of several score Communists in key positions does not necessarily make a movement of a revolution Communist dominated, I would reply by again referring to our experience with Cuba.

There were only a handful of clearly identifiable Communists in the upper echelon of Castro's movement. Among them were:

"Che" Guevara, the No. 2 man in the Castro movement;

Raul Castro, commander of the so-called second front;

Gen. Alberto Bayo, who fought with the Communists in the Spanish civil war and who had a reputation as an expert on guerrilla tactics;

Carlos Rodriguez, former editor of the Communist newspaper, "Hoy," who was in charge of propaganda and who drew

up the first plans for the revolutionary government;

Ramiro Valdes, political commissar under Raul Castro, now head of the secret police;

Celia Sanchez, Fidel Castro's mistress; Vilma Espin, who is today the wife of Raul Castro.

As for Castro himself, there was no proof that he was a Communist, but his participation in the Bogota uprising of 1948, during which he broadcast over the rebel radio, was much more in the pattern of the young Communist revolutionary who looks upon the entire non-Communist world as the target rather than in the pattern of the young Latin American nationalist revolutionary who takes to the streets, rightly or wrongly, because he is concerned over the situation in his own country.

There were elements in our intelligence community at the time who were seriously worried over the degree of Communist participation in the upper echelons of the Castro movement and who submitted warnings that because of this infiltration a Castro takeover would almost certainly mean a Communist takeover.

The Subcommittee on Internal Security received no evidence that any of these warnings had ever been transmitted to the Secretary of State Herter.

On the other hand, the evidence established that reports had come to Secretary Herter from Mr. William Wieland, director of the Caribbean desk, stating that there was no conclusive proof that the Castro movement was Communist-dominated or that Castro himself was a Communist.

In the purely literal sense, this was true.

There was no conclusive proof, if by this one means evidence that will stand up in a court of law.

But to anyone who has any understanding of the nature of Communist operations and of how much power can be wielded by a half dozen or a dozen Communists in key positions in a small movement, the participation of this very limited number of clearly identifiable Communists at command level in the Castro movement was ample reason for concern.

There were far more clearly identifiable Communists in key positions in the Dominican rebel movement when President Johnson decided to intervene, than there had ever been in the Castro movement before it came to power.

Fifty-four Communists may seem a trifling matter to the innocent, but as a highly knowledgeable and respected European socialist said when he received the information:

Fifty-four Communists is fifty-four too many. Even one Communist in a key position would be extremely dangerous.

HOW THE COMMUNISTS STOLE THE REVOLUTION

The attempted coup d'etat of April 24 was originally engineered by prominent Dominicans who were followers of ex-President Bosch.

There is some reason for believing that they solicited the assistance of the Dominican Communists in the mistaken

belief that they would be able to control them.

Whether or not there was a formal agreement between the Bosch lieutenants and the Communists, the fact, nevertheless, is that within 1 or 2 hours of the first rebel actions, members of the three Communist movements in the Dominican Republic were out in the streets of Santo Domingo calling on the people to join the demonstration for the restoration of constitutional government under ex-President Bosch.

The Communists moved with precision and discipline, and according to an obvious master plan.

First they obtained quantities of arms and ammunition from the "27th of February camp" outside Santo Domingo, where rebelling army officers had seized control when the coup began.

Then, armed paramilitary teams fanned out into the downtown and slum areas, taking control of secondary targets and organizing the inhabitants.

According to a communication I received from Mr. Paul Bethel, director of the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba and an old Latin American hand, the next move of the Communists, after arming their adherents, was to seize the radio station.

"At 2:30 p.m. on Saturday," said Mr. Bethel in his memorandum to me "mobs led by Cuban Communist Luis Acosta seized Santo Domingo's radio and television stations. Acosta paraded people across the TV screen with rehearsed shouts of 'We demand a return to constitutionality and we want Juan Bosch as President.' Some of the demonstrators were dressed as sailors, others wore army uniforms. All were armed to the teeth with machineguns and rifles. Viewers were told that the military had joined in the demand for the return of Juan Bosch. Mobs were told to 'pour into the streets and celebrate the victory of the people over the downfall of Reid Cabral.'"

Mr. Bethel described how the Communists handed out rifles, tommyguns, and grenades to the so-called turbas, or gangs of street toughs. He quoted a series of eye witnesses by name, describing how the turbas roamed the streets for 2 days, attacking homes and looting and raping and killing all those who disagreed with them or simply killing for kicks. One Scotch news photographer, he said, had counted 90 bodies in a single block and had come back sickened at the wanton murder.

The list of Communist participants in the Dominican revolution made public by the administration, include 18 persons who were known to have received training in subversive and paramilitary tactics in Cuba. The others on the list, although not as important, have been identified over a period of several years as Communists and Castroite adherents.

To run through the entire list would be tiring and meaningless. Let me therefore give you a few examples of the type of Communist participation which was clearly established in the early days of the revolt.

Among the activists who were identified as prime organizers of the paramilitary teams that roamed the streets of Santo Domingo were Buenaventura Johnson and Fidelio Despradel, leaders of the pro-Moscow Communist Party, which calls itself the Dominican Popular Socialist Party, or DPSP for short.

Also identified as prime organizers of the paramilitary units were Jaime Duran, a Dominican who had received training in Cuba, and Juan Ducoudray, a known Castro agent who had been actively engaged in smuggling weapons into the Dominican Republic from Cuba.

It was also established that one of the chief directors of the rebel forces, Manuel Gonzalez Gonzalez, was a veteran of the Spanish Communist Party who had been working with the Dominican Communist Party for several years.

I think it interesting in this connection to quote a paragraph from the report put out by the OAS Committee on its interview with Colonel Caamano—

The special committee was witness during that interview with the so-called Constitutional Military Command to one detail that could not pass unnoticed. This was the presence of a uniformed person carrying arms, who said he was part of the command and who spoke Spanish with a pronounced foreign accent. The Secretary General of the Organization of American States interrogated him in a loud voice before everyone, asking him: "Who are you? What are you doing here?" The person replied: "I am Andre Riviere, my nationality is French, I fought in the French army in Indochina, and I am working in Santo Domingo. I have joined this command." While he took no part in the conversations, Riviere was in the discussion room during the time of the interview, and the authority with which he gave orders to the guards posted at the windows and the door where we were was quite obvious.

In stating these facts I do not mean to say that the revolt from its inception was engineered by and under the control of the Communists. On the contrary, the evidence is that the revolt, to the extent that it was organized, was initially organized by followers of ex-President Bosch, but that they were outmaneuvered by the Communists and that the control of the movement was taken out of their hands within a matter of days.

The revolt got underway on April 24. By April 27, virtually all of the authentic non-Communist leaders, recognizing that their movement had been captured by the Communists, had taken asylum in foreign embassies or had gone into hiding.

Rafael Molina Urena, who had been named provisional president when the revolt began, took asylum in the Colombian Embassy.

Martinez Francisco, the secretary general of Bosch's party, publicly called upon the rebels to lay down their arms.

Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, another member of the provisional cabinet, who had been one of the chief architects of the revolt, informed a member of the American Embassy that the Communists had taken over command positions in the revolt and that he himself was with-

drawing from it because he did not wish to support a Castroite grab for power.

Colonel Hernandez, the most prominent army officer associated with the revolt, is reported to have suffered a nervous breakdown and to have sought asylum.

It cannot be emphasized too much that President Johnson's decision to intervene came only after the non-Communist leaders of the revolt had admitted defeat and abandoned the movement, leaving it in the virtually undisputed control of the Communist activists.

The Communists began to infiltrate and take control of the insurrection almost from the moment it was launched on the morning of April 24.

By April 26, they already exercised a serious degree of control.

By April 27, their control had reached such alarming proportions that virtually all of the authentic non-Communist leaders had abandoned the revolution.

On April 28, as Ambassador Stevenson pointed out in his speech before the U.N. Security Council, the situation in Santo Domingo was one of complete chaos. Hundreds of bodies lay in the streets. Armed bands, he said, roamed the city, plundering, burning, and murdering; and international Communist agents continued to pass out arms to all those who could be incited to follow them.

On that day, the military junta, which appeared to be the only responsible authority in the whole of Santo Domingo, addressed a request to the American Ambassador for "temporary intervention and assistance in restoring order."

It is clear that, in consequence of early reports from Santo Domingo, preparations had been made to respond to any contingency in the Dominican Republic. However, it cannot be emphasized too much that the landing of the U.S. marines did not take place until the evening of April 28—after the request from the junta had been received, and a full 24 hours after the Communist infiltration of the rebel command had been confirmed by the desertion of Bosch's chief lieutenants.

#### THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION

It is a truly superlative exhibition of gall when the Soviet delegates to the United Nations assail American intervention in the Dominican Republic, because this is the same delegation that defended the Soviet action in sending 5,000 tanks into Hungary to put down the Hungarian revolution and in massacring 25,000 citizens of Budapest.

There is somewhat more reason to be concerned when American editorials come out in very similar terms against our intervention in the Dominican Republic, and even go so far as suggesting that there is little to choose, morally, between Soviet intervention in Hungary and American intervention in the Dominican Republic.

All of this suggests to me that the Communists have been able to twist the word "intervention" for their own propaganda purposes in a manner that has induced some of our decent citizens to

lose all sight of the basic moral and human issues.

The Communists have intervened, are intervening today, and will continue to intervene in every situation where they can serve their own evil ends.

Sometimes, they have intervened by direct and massive military action, as in Korea, Hungary and Tibet.

Sometimes they have intervened through quisling minorities, operating under the protection of Red army bayonets. This was how they seized power in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary.

Sometimes they have intervened by fostering, training, equipping, and directing guerrilla and terrorist movements.

In this way, they almost succeeded in seizing power in Greece; they threatened and seriously retarded the postwar recovery of the Philippines, Burma, and Malaya; they conquered the greater part of Vietnam, and are now threatening the democratic Republic of South Vietnam.

And, it is in this way, and with logistical support from the Soviet Union, that they have today occupied large parts of the Kingdom of Laos and now threaten its total subjugation.

It is what Soviet intervention stands for, rather than intervention per se, that makes their intervention, whatever form it may take, a crime against mankind and against freedom.

When human life is threatened, it is our moral duty to intervene to save it, if it is reasonably within our power to do so.

When human rights are denied, or human freedoms are threatened, it is also the moral duty of civilized men to intervene. Herein lies the entire justification for the civil rights movement in our own country. But precisely the same considerations should apply in our attitude to other countries, when we can reasonably intervene on behalf of justice.

When the Communists intervene covertly, as they did in Cuba and as they are now doing in the Dominican Republic to establish tyrannical regimes which deny all human freedoms and which massacre those opposing them on a genocidal scale, then I say that it is the moral duty of civilized nations to come to the assistance of those whose freedom is thus threatened.

It is in response to this moral duty that President Johnson acted in the Dominican Republic.

#### THE NATURE OF OUR INTERVENTION

President Johnson acted forcefully. But in my opinion he also acted with the greatest restraint and propriety.

The marines took up positions designed to limit the fighting and protect human life. Although they had the power, if they had desired to use it, to crush rebel resistance and take over rebel held areas within 24 hours, they refrained from any military action against the rebels beyond a number of isolated incidents where they were obliged to fire in self-defense.

Moreover, the administration made it abundantly clear from the beginning

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that it considers interventions a stop-gap measure, that it plans to hand over to an OAS force as soon as such a force can be established, and that it is its intention to withdraw completely from the Dominican Republic as soon as arrangements have been made by the OAS for the establishment of a Dominican Government capable of assuring the people of that country of the right to determine their own future.

This position has been made abundantly clear by every spokesman for the administration from the first day of our intervention.

The fact that American soldiers have sometimes fired upon the rebel forces and that they have not fired on the forces of the junta, has been construed as proof that we have been giving military support to the junta against the rebels. Such an interpretation has a surface plausibility. But it ignores the fact that our men have been firing at the rebels on occasion because the rebels have been firing at them, and that it has not been firing at the forces of the junta for the simple reason that the junta has not been firing at them.

There are standing orders that the U.S. forces will not fire unless fired upon and the right to return fire has been reserved to battalion commanders. Moreover, I am assured by competent authorities that these instructions are understood and that they have, with negligible exceptions, been honored.

Our forces have had to pay a high price for the restraint under which they must operate. The casualty toll as of this weekend was 19 American dead and 99 wounded—this in consequence of 462 cease-fire violations by the rebels.

There has been an unfortunate tendency to report rebel charges and allegations without troubling to check or confirm. Thus, several American newspapers on May 20 reported rebel charges that American troops had fired without provocation from the U.S. zone into rebel positions near the national palace, killing 5 men, among them, Colonel Rafael Fernandez Dominguez, special envoy of ex-president Bosch, who had been named minister of the interior in the Caamaño group.

According to a report I have received, Fernandez was one of a group of 20, operating in the area of the palace, which fired into the U.S. communications corridor. American soldiers returned the fire and soldiers of the Junta forces also opened fire on the rebels. The cross fire apparently killed five of the rebels, including Fernandez. But also among the rebel leaders slain in this exchange was Juan Miguel Roman, a member of the central committee of the Castroite 14th of June party, and a guerrilla expert of some reputation who has, since 1961, visited the U.S.S.R., Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and Algiers.

Told in these terms the story has a somewhat different ring.

#### THE REACTION IN LATIN AMERICA

Sweeping assertions have been made by some writers that President Johnson's actions in the Dominican Republic has done lasting damage to our relations with the Latin American peoples.

This is simply not so.

It is true that before the basic facts about American intervention in the Dominican Republic were circulated and assimilated, press reaction in Latin America was decidedly negative. But over the past several weeks there has been a dramatic shift in the attitude of the Latin American press and Latin American leaders, because word is getting back from the OAS Commission and from Latin American diplomats in Santo Domingo.

Today there is an increasing awareness of the essential fact that the United States acted as it did because there was an imminent danger of a Communist takeover and because every hour was precious. And there are many who were critical of U.S. intervention during the first days who are now prepared to admit that their initial reaction was "overly legalistic."

As of this juncture it is my understanding that in a few countries notably Mexico, Venezuela, and Chile, the majority of the newspapers still remain critical of U.S. action in the Dominican Republic. In virtually all of the other countries, however, there has been far more press comment supporting U.S. action than criticizing or condemning it.

I believe that some of the critics in our country could learn a good deal from a reading of the Latin American press. Let me quote to you just a few samples of the items that I have had researched.

Example No. 1 is the following statement which appeared in the influential and moderately liberal newspaper "El Tiempo" of Bogotá, Colombia, on May 5:

So long as the Latin American Republics do not have an international force that can intervene in cases like that of the Dominican Republic, we must accept, much as it hurts our national pride, the inevitability of American intervention.

The second item which I should like to quote is an editorial which appeared on May 4 in "El Mundo," a liberal daily published in Caracas, Venezuela:

Communist, with its claws hovering over Dominican territory, tried to take over one more front in America and establish there a branch of the island governed by Fidel Castro \* \* \* we freemen of America ought to be on the side of freedom. And the United States, besides being a free country, and being the traditional friends of Venezuelans and of all American nations, is defending our right to live in our own way without the intrusion of foreign doctrines which harm and corrupt the thinking of our peoples. Our peoples, traditionally Catholic, never have been on the side of communism.

Next, I should like to call to the attention of my colleagues this statement by a commentator on the Honduras official radio, Radio America, on May 7:

The humanitarian decisions of the North American President Lyndon B. Johnson has opened the way, over the heads of the timid and the professional pacifists, to authorize the sending of North American soldiers of liberty of America to mitigate the tragedy of a sister country.

As a final sample of the editorials that have recently been appearing in the Latin American press, I wish to read to

you a passage from "La Prensa," of Lima, Peru, which is regarded as moderately conservative:

That the myth of absolute "nonintervention" suits only the Reds is demonstrated by the position taken by the Creole Communists. Their protests against unilateral North American intervention have not been so obstreperous as it has been against the possibility of collective intervention.

Summing up the Latin American reaction in last week's Newsweek, Milan J. Kubie, chief Latin American correspondent, put it this way:

The relative absence of riots and other demonstrations on this continent emphasizes the general feeling that, while intervention is bad, a second Cuba would be far worse. U.S. justifications of its actions are being listened to attentively.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks excerpts from other editorials that have appeared in Latin American newspapers and statements made by Latin American officials, supporting our action in the Dominican Republic, as well as some sundry items from the American press on this subject.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. DODD. I have taken the trouble to read these several quotations of the many that have come to my attention, because I believe that an infinite amount of damage is done by supposedly knowledgeable commentators and editors who tell their readers in sweeping terms and without troubling to check the facts, that our action in Vietnam has earned us the hatred of the peoples of Asia or that our action in the Dominican Republic has earned us the hatred of the peoples of the Americas.

#### THE EUROPEAN REACTION

While it has been reported from many directions that the British Foreign Office and most other allied chancelleries in Europe accept the harsh necessity for President Johnson's action, there can be no question but that there has been far more criticism than support in the columns of the European press.

To a very large extent, this criticism is a playback of the criticism that has appeared in several major American newspapers. And thereby hangs a moral which I believe has been most eloquently articulated by the veteran columnist Joseph Alsop in his article of May 12. I want to quote a few paragraphs from this article, because I believe it merits the attention of all of us in this body as well as of the American press.

The ugly, unhappy business in Santo Domingo is another, especially clear proof of a rule that should always be borne in mind by all Americans who have a public voice, whether in the Senate, or in the press or elsewhere.

When the going gets rough—so the rule runs—think twice or even three times about what you say; for what you say will always be used to embarrass or restrict your own Government's policy, if this is at all possible.

In the present instance, the Times of London appears to have gone through the U.S. press with a fine-toothed comb, with special emphasis on its great opposite number in



New York, to find means of presenting the American action in Santo Domingo in the worst possible light in its news columns.

A good many of the British newspapers have followed suit.

Using the main raw material of American public statements critical of President Johnson's decision, but also using far more freedom of invention, the French television and radio networks and most Gaullist newspapers in Paris have managed to sound pretty much like the Communist East German radio, though with a greater knack for snide insinuations.

#### THE BALANCE SHEET

It would be senseless to pretend that the President's action in Santo Domingo will overnight usher in an era of tranquility and plenty and simon-pure democracy for the Dominican people.

The road ahead for the Dominican people will be a hard one, no matter what the composition of the government that emerges from the present turmoil.

Let us hope that, through the OAS, it will prove possible to establish either an interim caretaker government, or else a provisional Dominican administration which is as broad as circumstances will permit, which recognizes the importance of preventive action against the Communist conspiracy, and which contains enough men of ability and dedication to make orderly and progressive government possible.

Whatever the difficulties and uncertainties that lie ahead in the Dominican Republic, all the indications now are that President Johnson's courageous action has struck a decisive blow for the cause of freedom in the Americas.

By his action, President Johnson has prevented the emergence of a second Castro regime in the Americas.

He has saved the Dominican people from the merciless tyranny of communism and has created conditions which will assure them, let us hope at a not-too-distant date, of the opportunity to determine their own future.

He has served firm notice on Havana and Moscow and Peiping that under no circumstances are we prepared to tolerate the establishment in this hemisphere of another regime committed to the subversion and subjugation of the Americas.

He has created an image of America that will serve us in good stead with friend and foe alike.

But, perhaps most important, his leadership has encouraged the Organization of American States to come to grips with the problem of subversion through stealth and fraud.

To my mind, one of the most encouraging developments of recent days is the universally negative reaction, throughout the Americas, to the decision of the U.N. Security Council to dispatch its own observers to the Dominican Republic.

There are places where the U.N. can help and places where it cannot help.

The governments of the Americas resent the intrusion of the United Nations observers because they are convinced that it will only undercut their position and complicate their task. They feel that this is their problem, and they are determined to deal with it on their own.

This is a most wholesome and welcome reaction. In the light of this reaction, indeed, I think our representatives at the U.N. erred in failing to veto the establishment of a U.N. observer team in the Dominican Republic. As distasteful as it may be to resort to the veto, I hope we will not hesitate to employ the veto to prevent further meddling by the U.N. in a situation where their presence can do no good and may do much harm.

Despite all the criticism and abuse and misunderstanding and misrepresentation that has attended President Johnson's action in the Dominican Republic, it is my firm conviction that history will endorse and posterity will applaud his courageous intervention against the Communist conspiracy in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. President, I am sorry that I had to detain the officers of the Senate until this late hour. I am equally sorry that Senators who had obligations at this hour of the day which they were required to attend could not be present. Many Senators spoke to me and told me that they desired to be present but could not be, and that they would read what I had to say. I am grateful for that. I consider the subject important.

When asked by the leadership today if I would wait until we had concluded our work on the voting rights bill, I was happy to do so.

That does not in any sense lessen my feeling that the subject is an important one.

I hope Senators will take the time to read what I have said.

I am confident that some Senators may wish to comment on the subject at a later date. I will be glad to be present when that takes place.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

#### EXHIBIT 1

#### LATIN AMERICAN MEDIA REACTION: RE DOMINICAN CRISIS

Jornal do Comercio of Rio said editorially May 4: "Now there can be no doubt whatever about the necessity of the peacefully inspired intervention in the Dominican Republic which was in the grip of professional revolutionaries. President Johnson's speech last Sunday was convincing because of the detail with which he described the facts."

The Mexico City Ultimas Noticias de Excelsior, conservative, said on May 4: "The Castro-Communist menace was what moved President Johnson to send marines and soldiers to the island, a unilateral act for which he should have been able to count on the decision of the rest of Latin America."

Rio de Janeiro's O Globo said May 5 in its editorial entitled "A Historic Decision": "Determined to deter the advance of Soviet imperialism not only in the West but in the East, as the sacrifice of so many American lives bears witness, it is evident that the United States could not remain idle when in our own hemisphere forces directed from Moscow tried to establish a new beachhead, delivering the Dominican Republic to some native Fidel Castro ready to play the Kremlin's game in America. The action of the United States in the Dominican Republic is not an isolated episode but part of its anti-Communist strategy. It is not an imperialist act, as is alleged by some whenever liberty opposes tyranny."

Rio de Janeiro's Liberal Diario de Noticias editorial on May 7 approved the U.S.

action and said: "In its intervention the United States is complying with the extensive obligations imposed on it by its status as the major democracy of the hemisphere."

O Estado de São Paulo, moderately conservative of Sao Paulo, said May 4: "In Cuba, in Vietnam, in Zanzibar, in Tanzania, we have seen every year over the past 10 years a repetition of the Communist attempt to establish its domination. 'Realpolitik' demands that we must face these situations despite protests by public opinion and certain diplomatic taboos. Ours must be the policy of the United States and the OAS."

Rio's O Jornal said May 4: "The intervention of the American Armed Forces in Santo Domingo at that moment was not only urgent but indispensable."

El Espectador, liberal, very influential, of Bogotá, said on May 4: "We would have preferred it if from the first day, from the hour of the first debarkation, statements to the world had been in the same frank and precise language as that employed by Johnson Sunday night."

Jornal do Brasil of May 6 said: "Acting unilaterally in open violation of the inter-American principles, the United States moved to prevent the establishment of one more Soviet beachhead on this continent."

El Mercurio, right center, influential, of Santiago on May 8 declared that: "Democracy cannot be an inoperative and blind concept which permits its own structures to be destroyed and replaced by Marxist totalitarianism."

Independent La Nueva Provincia of Bahía Blanca, Argentina, approved the U.S. action and said May 6: "Everyone knows that for a long time the only country in the Caribbean that has violated the rules of nonintervention has been that of Fidel Castro, in back of whom are Peiping and Moscow supporting unconditionally his activities aimed at subversion and the destruction of liberty on the continent. Those who criticize the United States now are the same ones who would later beg for U.S. intervention to crush the Communist aggressor after he had invaded another Latin American country. Or was it not that which took place in Cuba?"

Managua's La Prensa said May 5 in one of its columns: "As a British newspaper said, being a world power is such a thankless task that nothing that it does sits well with anyone. When they planned to invade Cuba, the Yankees were atrocious imperialists. When they did not invade it they were fools for not having invaded and prevented the Communists from taking over."

La Noticia, liberal, of Managua, on May 5 editorially approved Ambassador Stevenson's explanation of the U.S. position. It said: Mr. Stevenson, one of the most able politicians and brilliant orators and man of letters in the United States, clearly established in his speech before the Security Council: (1) the United States has no intention of dictating the future policy of the Dominican Republic; (2) the United States will not fail to honor its pledge to defend the rights of all free peoples to choose their own destiny; (3) a revolution becomes a matter of hemispheric preoccupation only when its objective is the installation of a Communist dictatorship. In the case of the Dominican Republic the arguments of Adlai Stevenson were crushing. The propaganda of the Soviet Union were rendered counterproductive."

La Nacion, conservative, of San Jose, said on May 4: "How can we silence those who speak nonsense about Yankee imperialism?"

La Religion, Catholic, of Caracas, Venezuela, declared May 5 that: "The North American intervention, with all its obstacles and inconveniences, is completely justified because the Dominican conflict can become a new Cuba."

May 24, 1965

COMMENTS OF LATIN AMERICAN OFFICIALS  
AND STATESMEN ON DOMINICAN SITUATION

On May 3 former Argentine Minister of Economy Alvaro Alsogaray, and Raul Ondarts, leader of the Centrist Udelpa Party, as well as private "anti" Communist association Faeda, justified U.S. action.

Text of Brazilian foreign ministry communique, May 3, 1965, supporting a United States proposal on the Dominican situation:

"Aware of its duties as member of the Organization of American States, the Brazilian Government has decided to give its affirmative vote to a proposal presented by the United States to the Foreign Relations Ministers' Consultative meeting for the creation of a good offices commission to examine the situation in the Dominican Republic.

"The Brazilian Government will exercise every effort in order to find a solution which, without jeopardizing the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, will contribute to restore order in Santo Domingo and to preserve the democratic liberties, peace, and security of the continent.

"The Brazilian Government has received from the Government of the United States the assurance that the landing of infantry marines was effected to protect the lives of its subjects and other foreign residents in that country, in view of the prevailing insecurity and the authorities' declarations that they could not offer guarantees to the population."

In a press interview on May 4 in Rio, Foreign Minister Vasco Leitao da Cunha gave strong support to the United States. He said that he had hopes that the OAS would act favorably on the U.S. proposal for an international force. He said "there is no time now for hypocritical postures. Countries that now, for public effect, condemn the North American initiative should not be applauded, as the defense of the continent is also in their interest. I wish to point out to you gentlemen that neither the U.N. nor the OAS Charter foresaw establishment of an international force for peacekeeping operations. The U.N. case, i.e., the grave Suez crisis of 1956, stimulated the creation, by an emergency meeting, of an international force that was quickly assembled to operate in the area of conflagration. We are absolutely sure that in the American system is has also become necessary to adopt courageous measures and to put them into practice therein. In the future, should (present) experience make it appear advisable, the subject might become a matter for institutionalization."

On May 5, the Honduras Constituent Assembly rejected a liberal motion to condemn U.S. military intervention in the Dominican Republic.

On May 5, the press of San Jose, Costa Rica gave wide coverage to a statement addressed to the Costa Rican nation by Otilio Ulate Blanco, ex-president of the republic and head of the liberal opposition's National Union Party. He denounced Communist penetration in the Dominican Republic and said: "If the United States should lose the leadership of democracy in the hemisphere or suffer a weakening of that leadership, democracy would be in danger of disappearing in a short time \* \* \*. If the United States had not come to the defense of human rights in the Dominican vortex, those rights, the most sacred that men have, would have been wrecked in the midst of devastation and slaughter. To save America, to save democracy, to protect human rights by all the means in its power, to save liberty and peace, these are the tasks which have been imposed on the United States. To refuse support to the United States in one of its severest hours of trial is unworthy and cowardly."

The National Constituent Assembly of Guatemala passed a resolution May 5 supporting "all means the OAS may adopt to avoid allowing the Dominican Republic to

(fall into the clutches of international communism."

In the deliberative part of the resolution the assembly declared: "The bloody events which occurred in the Dominican Republic during the past week as a consequence of the fratricidal struggle between the Dominican armed forces and popular militia directed and backed by Castro-communism place in danger the survival of the inter-American system. The Dominican Republic is suffering armed and ideological aggression at the hands of totalitarian communism. At the same time the security of the free nations of the continent is threatened."

The assembly "urged the OAS and member nations to take charge of the situation so that peace and order may be reestablished in the strife-torn Caribbean island."

On May 5 the President of the Supreme Court of Honduras, Gustavo Acosta Jellia declared that "The landing of U.S. Armed Forces in the Dominican Republic, rather than being a violation of American pacts, should be called a preventive action in defense of democracy. The United States of America does not seek territorial gains nor any of the other things which the recognized leftist militancy of the hemisphere has accused them. They are only trying to avoid the Dominican Republic's being converted into another advanced base of international communism such as, unfortunately, what the island of Cuba is today."

Nicaragua's President Rene Schick Gutierrez said May 7 in his monthly press conference that Nicaragua, as an OAS member, would consider itself obligated to take part in the inter-American force requested by the OAS for the Dominican Republic. The President added that the OAS resolution was necessary for continental security.

President Schick said the OAS Charter must be reformed to deal with the type of situation that is occurring in the Dominican Republic since existing agreements do not authorize either unilateral or collective intervention in such a case.

Distinguished international jurist Victor Moreno Goytia wrote in El Panama America on May 8 that "on May 6, 1965, an event of American interdependence marked a new era of unity through coercive power, a formula demanded by the new times for the security and independence of nations, protection of popular sovereignty and the defense of the democratic regional system threatened by extracontinental totalitarian absolutism."

"On May 8, several deputies of the National Constituent Assembly of Honduras were asked what they thought of the 'invasion' by the United States of the Dominican Republic. The vice president of the assembly, Senor Urmeneta Ramirez, said: 'In my opinion the erroneously labeled 'invasion' by the United States of the Dominican Republic is a legitimate act born of necessity and provoked by the undeniable intervention of foreign forces whose mission is to undermine the bases of the democratic American system.' Senor Jose Mazzoni Obando, Nationalist Deputy, said 'the intervention is justified since it has to do with rescue from another intervention which would be more disadvantageous, as in the case of Cuba which all of Latin America laments.'"

Deputy Odilon Ayestas Loped, a liberal, said: "I consider that in the matter of the Dominican Republic the United States has done nothing more than to preserve democracy in America."

Nationalist Deputy Senora Henrriquez Ceron said: "I do not consider that the United States invaded the Dominican Republic for imperialist reasons; its act in my opinion is in the defense of the democratic ideals to which all countries of America are obligated."

Paraguayan Foreign Minister Raul Sapena Pastor declared on May 8 that Paraguay

backs the formation of an inter-American force and is in a condition to contribute to it with troops so the OAS can cope with the Dominican crisis. Sapena Pastor said the Paraguayan position in the OAS supports the U.S. operation, which has been carried out very successfully. He added that Paraguay would not presently recognize any Dominican Government. Although Col. Francisco Caamano has asked for Paraguayan recognition in a cable sent by Dominican Foreign Minister Cury, the Paraguayan Foreign Ministry has not answered it.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Sunday Star, May 9, 1965]

INTERPRETIVE REPORTS: THE DILEMMA IN  
SANTO DOMINGO—UNITED STATES AVERTED  
RED TAKEOVER, DIPLOMATS SAY

(By Haynes Johnson, Star staff writer)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.—Some of the pieces of the Dominican puzzle are falling into place. What emerges is a clear pattern of all the classic Communist attempted takeovers—with some new elements added.

U.S. Government sources on Thursday made public a portion of the intelligence information which led President Johnson to decide to send American forces ashore.

Boiled down to the essentials, the intelligence reports showed that widespread Communist and Castroite activity had infiltrated and were dominating the Dominican revolution.

The information in this story comes from top-ranking foreign diplomats here, some of whose countries publicly have expressed criticism of the United States dispatch of troops to the Dominican Republic.

## INTERVENTION ESSENTIAL

In private, their story is quite different.

All agree that the U.S. military intervention was essential—and that it came with only hours to spare. Without the presence of U.S. troops, they say, thousands of more lives would have been lost.

All agree that if U.S. troops are withdrawn now the situation will return to complete anarchy.

All agree that a definite Communist conspiracy exists within the Dominican Republic. The consensus is that the Communists are small in number, but highly trained and extremely effective.

For the United States, the outlook is gloomy. There appears no way out of the present situation. And the best guesses are that the U.S. occupation will be long and costly.

## POORLY EXECUTED

Here is the way one diplomat explained the events of the past 2 weeks:

It began, he said, with the revolt of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), Juan Bosch's party. The revolt started with sincere elements who wanted to return to the constitutional government and bring Bosch back from exile in Puerto Rico as President. The Dominican generals, led by Elias Wessin y Wessin, a strong anti-Communist, swiftly reacted with a counter coup. General Wessin's planes bombed and strafed the city indiscriminately, killing many innocent people.

"I may say it was very poorly executed," the diplomat said, referring to Wessin's military efforts which resulted only in thoroughly alienating the people.

When the PRD people gave up, General Wessin and the military appeared to have gained a decisive victory. Then the Communists took over.

"My own sources told me that the Communists reorganized with a rapidity that was astounding," the diplomat said.

## WESSIN FORCE POSTED

Within 48 hours Wessin had won—and then lost. The ragtag rebels totally routed the Wessin forces. Twenty thousand weap-

ons were distributed to the people. Santo Domingo lived in days of terror and butchery. "Now bear in mind this was organized by a small number of men. Very small in number, but not in quality. The quality is the point, not the quantity.

"This leadership without any doubt has been expertly trained for this precise purpose. It is sufficient to say that no amateurs could have achieved those results. It was brilliant, a remarkable achievement."

It was at that point that many of the original pro-Bosch leaders of the revolt learned that they had been betrayed—and taken over by Communists. They took refuge in foreign embassies.

One prominent pro-Bosch Dominican, for example, surrounded his own house with barbed wire.

#### NEW ELEMENTS

"A small body of Communists had achieved a success of significant measure," the diplomat said.

There were new elements in the situation. None of them was promising for the United States and Latin America. The Communists had shown greater capacity, more expertise, and a higher degree of effective use of terrorist attack than many people had thought possible.

"This is what the Marines were met with when they arrived," the diplomat said. "It was very trying, and I don't think it's unfair to say that they were shaken."

"Complete anarchy swiftly fell on this city. It was a highly terrifying position."

"I believe the Marine force came to the city with only hours to spare. If they had not been sent in, thousands of lives would have been lost. That is my honest opinion."

#### ALTERNATIVES POSED

Turning to the future, the diplomat posed three alternatives—none of them attractive for the United States. These were:

First, returning Bosch or backing the rebel leader, Col. Francisco Caamaño Deno. If that happened he predicted there would be another crisis in 9 months and the country would collapse economically.

Second, back one of the "old faces"—a politician from the past who might be an acceptable compromise. If that happened rioting would continue. The youths who have had a taste of the power of weapons would make assassination the order of the day. The country would be prostrated.

Third, a long occupation by the U.S. forces coupled with a major economic commitment to the island. In effect, the United States would be ruling the Dominican Republic.

"And that is the only bright feature of that prospect, for the economic position of the Dominican Republic would be greatly improved. Another good feature of that direction is that the old generals would be removed from power."

"You must understand that this is an explosion of rage and fury."

#### SEES MARINES NEEDED

By that he meant that the Dominican Republic is afflicted with all the ills of a Caribbean country—poverty, ignorance, and disease. To these are added the legacy of the police state of Trujillo, the oppressive opulence of the wealthy contrasted with the misery of the many.

And there are new factors. At the present the country is in the midst of a terrible drought. From the parched soil of the peasants springs a genuine restiveness—and a reception to follow a revolutionary banner. With these facts in mind, it is easy to see why the diplomat commented:

"If your marines are taken away, a great many lives will be lost. War is organized anarchy. This is unorganized anarchy."

Another high diplomat viewed the future this way:

"The political problem is absolutely, without solution unless you (the United States) take over completely, and that means you have to solve a problem that is damned difficult to solve."

Then, in the understatement of the day he said:

"I would not want to be advising the American government now."

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, May 10, 1965]

#### HOURS OF GREATNESS—U.S. SHOULDERS RESPONSIBILITY

(By William S. White)

These are hours of greatness in the long life of this Nation, as both in Asia and in this hemisphere it shoulders the pack of its responsibilities and so walks the hard and lonely road of duty discharged and honor satisfied.

Still, these are hours also of a poignant sadness. For in acting for the safety of free men, specifically and presently in the Dominican Republic in the Western World and in South Vietnam in the East, the U.S. Government is under the most shrill and in some instances the most venomous attacks from tiny but violent minorities that any responsible Government has had to bear in our lifetime.

At home, a bitter half-handful of Democratic Senators snipes tirelessly at an American mission, for the defense of the South Vietnamese victims of a brutal Communist invasion, to which the solemn word of three successive American Presidents and of both political parties has been pledged.

At home a bitter half handful of Democratic Senators snipes tirelessly at an American intervention to halt an attempt at a Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic, which might one day have confronted us with another Castro Cuba.

These criticisms are presented as only that "free debate" which all Americans expect and defend. But they are not really in the tradition of free debate. For these critics have loaded the dice by ignoring or even denying the immense and crucial truth that it was not we who invaded South Vietnam but rather the Communists; that it was not we who sought to subvert a Latin neighbor but rather the Communists.

The bottom innuendo of such critics is that it is their own country that is the aggressor—that the United States, which is spending blood and treasure to halt a pattern of aggression—is no less plain, no less savage, if at the moment less wide, than was the Hitler pattern long ago.

And the inescapable bottom logic of some of these critics—men like Senator WAYNE MORSE, of Oregon, whose inevitable contemptuous animus against any who may disagree with him is notorious in his own Chamber—is simply that we should cut and run from Asia and leave it to somebody else to talk the Communist colossus of China out of swallowing it all—perhaps.

Abroad, the European minority of one that is President Charles de Gaulle of France takes step after step to destroy that Western Alliance, which lifted his own country from a petulant powerlessness and for half a generation has protected it behind a shield of primarily American power largely raised up on the backs of American taxpayers.

His latest in these steps is to denounce the United States for halting Communist expansionism in Latin America and for attempting to stop it in Asia—and Britain for trying to save Malaysia from Communist-backed Indonesia.

It is quite unnecessary to impute motives to Charles de Gaulle; he himself years ago publicly disclosed them.

[From the Reporter, May 20, 1965]

EDITORIAL: OUR NO-NONSENSE PRESIDENT

(By Max Ascoli)

In Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic, President Johnson has more than ever before exhibited his immoderate passion for detail, a passion nourished now by a technology that keeps him in close touch with the soldiers whose lives are endangered by the use he makes of his authority. This consuming passion for personal intervention has been characteristic of Lyndon Johnson ever since he started his career in politics, but as long as it could be thought of as a superb exhibit of a wheeler-dealer talent, it was more admired or envied by his fellow politicians than criticized. He has always known how to make people vote freely as he wanted them to vote. But he had been spared, until comparatively recently, the experience of giving men orders that involved the risk of their lives. Neither had he had occasion to command that any wholesale category of people called enemies be killed.

His immense knowledge of domestic politics used to be accompanied by a limited acquaintance with international affairs. When, during the Eisenhower administration, he was Senate majority leader, he played a part, although a secondary one, in all major decisions affecting the conduct of our diplomacy; during the Kennedy administration he became more closely associated with the making of American policy abroad, sat on the National Security Council, traveled widely, and established relationships with statesmen and camel drivers.

Still, as is the case with every Vice President, the ultimate responsibility did not lie with him. Once President, he asserted himself from the start as if supreme authority were conatural with his being, and his subsequent triumphal election showed to what an extent the Nation recognized itself in him. Somehow it also happened that he had no compelling international difficulties to face for a time, a respite he used to lay his plans for the Nation's future. He had known poverty and the difficulty of getting an adequate education, and he had known success. He could not legislate his luck for everybody, but he wanted to see to it that a new American breed could grow free from the cruelties of hazard.

The new perils from abroad that came in the first year of Lyndon Johnson's elective Presidency were singularly mean, originating in some of the most improbable spots on earth, either in lands too far away or too close to our shores. In the distant lands, we were hampered by inadequate knowledge of their strategic and political relevance; in the lands close to us, we had always tended to act as colonizers or as imitation natives. Our present perils have been aggravated by the policies of the preceding administrations and by obdurate ways of thinking that are mostly inspired by a desire to negotiate our way toward peace.

Day in and day out, we hear the same old chatter about spheres of influence or about the benefit of polycentrism; we hear about the splintering of monoliths so reassuringly keeping pace with the splintering of what was never a monolith, our alliance. Even before the last war the idea was cherished of the miraculous solidarity and legal equality of the nations, great, medium, or pocket size, all called American, all sticking together, each of them going its own merry way.

President Johnson is not a man inclined to look for trouble in foreign affairs until trouble stares him in the face. Then he reacts, and if he has to react militarily, he does so without any of the bravado of the movie frontiersman shooting from the hip. Now his responsibilities have become far greater than any within the previous range of

his experience, and this experience he is compelled to broaden, for it has been the inactions or mistakes of some of his predecessors that have placed him in his present predicament. He cannot, for instance, look back for guidance in his action in Vietnam even if he reaches the conclusion that what is going on there is just a civil war. There was another civil war, in Hungary in 1956, but the West carefully avoided intervening. Should he derive from this notion that whenever communism, indigenous or imported, fights a civil war, its victory should be considered a natural right?

Vice President Johnson was in Berlin a very few days after the wall was erected. He saw there what defeat looks like. Under the administration Mr. Johnson served as Vice President, there occurred the Bay of Pigs tragedy, and then the missile crisis, which ended without onsite inspection. Once Cuba was made safe for communism, is there any reason to be surprised that communism started spreading all around?

In southeast Asia the President is unrolling his air attacks, each one because of his will and each one under his watchful eyes. As for the Dominican Republic, he reached his decision with great speed, without consulting many people aside from those strictly charged with giving him advice. There is scarcely any comparison between the two situations, except that in running both, he exhibits a supreme sense of personal responsibility. Why is he so overcommitted? people ask. We venture an answer: he is Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States.

[From the Reporter, May 20, 1965]

#### A SWITCH IN TIME

(By Adolf A. Berle)

On April 28, 1965, after 2 days of painful conferences and consideration, President Lyndon Johnson ordered a detachment of Marines to land in the Dominican Republic. The writer, who began his career fighting to end Woodrow Wilson's occupation of that country, believes the President made the right decision.

The President had to act immediately on a telephone report from Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.—that hundreds of Americans were in danger and strong action was needed to save their lives. In the larger view, he had reports indicating a steady infiltration into the republic of guerrillas trained in Cuba and Czechoslovakia, and of more coming. This was a further move in the continuing Communist campaign of subversion and aggression in the Caribbean. An uprising designed to reinstate Juan Bosch—who was duly elected President of the Dominican Republic in December 1962, but ousted by a military coup in September 1963—had provided the opportunity for a simultaneous rising by organized Communist groups. Within 48 hours the Bosch partisans, seeking democratic government, were infiltrated and then dominated by the trained Communist elements, and many of the Bosch leaders sought refuge in foreign embassies. As the pro-Bosch forces lost control, they opened the army arsenals to "the people." Not surprisingly, the Communist groups got most of the arms. Finally Mr. Johnson had to consider the effect of a possible Communist seizure of Santo Domingo in the vast context of Communist aggression from Vietnam to Africa.

I think that the President had little choice. He could have called in the Organization of American States, asked it to go to work, and stopped there. But the OAS has no guns and needs time to decide; meanwhile, events were moving dangerously fast. He could have sat by, praying for the American lives and watching unlimited bloodshed as Dominicans killed each other, then dealing as best he could with the outcome. This would have meant continuation of a fierce civil war, supplied with arms and reinforcements from Cuba. In that

case, the President might face a Dominican Republic in the hands of a Castro-style regime established by sheer terror. Or the President could act, creating the situation himself. He elected to act.

The elements he had to work with were not promising. Juan Bosch had been elected in 1962 by some 85 percent of the Dominican voters. His government had received all the support the United States could give. It was acclaimed as a worthy companion to the democratic Governments of Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica. Unhappily, there was little solid party organization behind Bosch. Thirty-one years of Trujillo dictatorship had wiped out practically every vestige of political structure. Bosch himself, honest and idealistic, a well-known Latin American literary figure, found trouble in managing affairs of state. Some of his supporters intrigued with the Communists or with the military. An ill-fated Castro-supported expedition of Dominican leftists and Cuban volunteers against Santo Domingo in 1959 had left behind a nucleus, the 14th of June Party, that caused intermittent trouble. Two Communist Parties, respectively Russian- and Chinese-oriented, were allowed to function. Castro Communists were also infiltrating some important labor unions.

Some Dominican Army officers and also some civilian elements believed that doors were being opened for a Communist takeover, in which case they would have their throats cut. That fear led Gen. Elias Vessín y Vessín and other army chiefs to bring off the coup in September 1963, that sent Bosch into exile. The United States and the democratic governments in the Caribbean protested. For a time, Washington cut off its aid, technical help, and other assistance.

The generals, however, did not follow the usual pattern. Declining to form a military government, they installed a civilian triumvirate that last year gave way to the regime of the former Foreign Minister, Donald Reid Cabral. His brother had been murdered by Trujillo; he himself had been imprisoned. He is the son of a Scot and a Dominican mother. Though Reid Cabral's regime was illegitimate, the American Embassy came to respect him. He was moving toward reestablishment of "legitimacy"—that is, the holding of elections scheduled for September. Cautiously, the U.S. Government was moving to sustain his hand. He endeavored to bring order out of administrative chaos, to pull together the Dominican economy, and to bring the army under civilian control. Many army officers disliked this. Some were pro-Bosch; others perhaps had played with the Communist agents. At all events, these elements planned an uprising, scheduled for June 1, to bring back Juan Bosch. Discovery of this plan forced action on April 25. The officers' revolt simultaneously, and apparently unintentionally, cleared the way for the armed emergence of the Communist guerrillas.

#### MAKING OUR STAND CLEAR

Meanwhile, the Caribbean situation assumed importance on the worldwide stage. Former President Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela insists that in Latin America the Communist factions linked to Moscow and Peking still work together. They cooperate in any action that may make trouble for the United States and in working to overthrow non-Communist governments. They had been unsuccessful in Venezuela, Brazil, and other countries, but they still have small units in armed revolt in Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala. Their technique of infiltrating genuine democratic movements and later seizing them has proved successful, as when Castro concealed his Communist affiliations until he had taken over. The probability has to be faced that the Communist Frente de Liberación Nacional in

Venezuela, the "violence areas" in Colombia, and the dissolved Guatemalan Communist Party will all become actively terrorist.

The myth had grown up in Communist circles that the United States cannot act in Latin America. American doctrine does indeed prohibit intervention. Too often that has been interpreted to keep Latin American rebellions armed, organized, financed, and directed in other countries from being recognized as the external attacks they really are. American doctrine does consider an attack on any American state as an attack on all, giving rise to the right of defense.

The time had come to make several things clear if the whole Caribbean was not to erupt:

That the United States would no longer be immobilized by the fiction that externally armed uprisings were merely local movements for reform.

That nonintervention in the internal affairs of a country does not prevent the United States from defending a country attacked from outside—despite the camouflage of "internal revolution."

That further attacks of the Castro variety cannot count on immunity from American force on a scale adequate to meet the contingency.

That the United States cannot afford another Cuba—particularly not in the Caribbean. The President's action made this clear—to Latin America, to Peking, and to Moscow.

Adverse Latin American opinion was urged as an argument against action. Actually, Latin America expects the United States to act and does not respect us much when we fail to do so. Argentina and Brazil promptly approved President Johnson's action. Costa Rica reportedly offered freedom fighters. The Council of the Organization of American States sent a peace-mediating commission; it arrived in Santo Domingo on May 2. The protest has not developed to the extent feared. Until Latin American governments are willing to give the OAS the forces and capacity to defend weak countries, the U.S. offers those governments their only effective defense, and they know it. Both before and after the Bay of Pigs affair, when the OAS was paralyzed by indecision, many Latin American diplomats said to me they thought the United States should act first and discuss later. Officially they may decry our action, but they want the power vacuum filled.

President Johnson has filled it. He will have many problems as a result. They are, I believe, less dangerous than the problems he would have faced had he stood aside. No one forgets that failure to take decisive action against Castro in 1961 brought us to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union in 1962.

If the President had not acted, what would have been the outcome? No one will ever know. The rebels might have restored the Bosch regime, though this seems unlikely. The Dominican Army might have produced a dictator, perhaps a new Trujillo. The Communist groups might have seized the Government, making a new Cuba. They might have taken to the hills, opening a new chapter of guerrilla bloodshed against either the forces of Vessín y Vessín or of a democratic Bosch regime. The least dangerous course for the President was to take the initiative and dominate events.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, May 4, 1965]

WALTER LIPPMANN

In the state of emergency, there was no time for a thorough investigation of all the facts. President Johnson took his decision to halt the rebellion on what, it seems to me, was the right ground.



It was that, if the Communists in the revolutionary forces took over the Government, the result would be for all practical purposes irreversible. There would never be another election while they were in power in Santo Domingo. On the other hand, while the Bosch restoration has been halted, the way is still open to the return of the party which won the 1963 election. By acting promptly and decisively the President has kept the way open as otherwise it might well have been closed forever.

It is quite plain from the President's speech that the United States does not want to see a restoration of the old reactionary regime and that it does want the kind of popular democratic revolution, committed to "democracy and social justice" which President Bosch represents.

If President Johnson, working with the OAS, can help the Dominicans find that something in between, can restore President Bosch, and shore him up while he carries through the drastic reforms which are necessary in order to extirpate the evils of Trujillo, evils that breed communism, it will be a bright day for the American Republics.

"Our intervention in the Caribbean island will, of course, be looked upon all over the world in the context of our intervention in southeast Asia.

"How then can we defend and justify ourselves?

"The ground, which is the one I take, is the old-fashioned and classical diplomatic ground that the Dominican Republic lies squarely within the sphere of influence of the United States, and that it is normal, not abnormal, for a great power to insist that within its sphere of influence, no other great power shall exercise hostile military and political force.

"Since we emerged from isolation in the beginning of this century, American foreign policy has been bedeviled by the utopian fallacy that because this is one world, special spheres of influence are an inherent evil and obsolete. Wilson proclaimed this globalism. Franklin Roosevelt adhered to it against Churchill's better judgment. And Johnson continues to invoke it without, I think, a sufficient study of it.

"As a matter of fact, experience must soon verify the truth that spheres of influence are fundamental in the very nature of international society. They are as much a fact of life as are birth and death. Great powers will resist the invasion of their spheres of influence."

[From the Washington Star, May 11, 1965]

#### U.S. INTERVENTION HELD NECESSARY

(By David Lawrence)

The American people may as well resign themselves to the prospect that both in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic the conflicts may be long-drawn out. Paradoxical as it may seem, the American policy in each instance can do more to avert the disaster of a third world war than all the conferences and discussions of peace objectives in the last decade have accomplished.

What the United States is doing in southeast Asia and in the Caribbean is both significant and constructive. Pacifists and other citizens who would like to make sure that the holocaust is avoided might well take a hard look at the facts of international behavior which led a supposedly civilized society into two world wars, causing the death of millions of human beings and leaving on the surviving peoples scars that have not been removed by the passage of time.

In Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic, the issue today is the same. Will an altruistic and humanitarian Nation, ready to supply billions of dollars for relief and development or armed forces to repel aggression, be thwarted and frustrated by cap-

tious critics or misguided appeasers inside and outside the United States?

The fallacy they do not perceive is that, once the tyranny of Communist imperialism takes over—particularly in the Caribbean, where Cuba stands as a realistic example of the tragedy than can ensue elsewhere in Latin America—the struggle against a truly dangerous intervention in the affairs of weaker republics of this hemisphere cannot be abandoned by the United States. The cause is as much one of self-preservation of the people of this country against threats from potential missile bases in nearby islands as it is the avoidance of a world war which could involve also the peoples of every other continent.

Much of the criticism of the policy of the U.S. Government in Santo Domingo is based on superficial thinking. Of what possible avail, for instance, is it to argue that the Communists who infiltrated the Dominican Republic and helped to foment revolution have not yet been convicted in the court of public opinion and that sufficient proof of their insidious devilry has not been produced? Also, of what real consequence is the argument that what the United States has done by intervening in Santo Domingo will hurt us with the other Latin American nations? This is an age-worn contention.

The truth is the people of the Central and South American countries want freedom and rarely get it. They seek a better standard of living for their growing populations, but they will never achieve it through communism. Their only salvation lies in such projects as the Alliance for Progress and the constant willingness of the United States to step in with its military forces to keep the Communist enemy from committing the peoples of this hemisphere to perennial slavery and bondage.

Despite the revived criticisms of the armed interventions by the United States in past years, the fact remains that this country has not annexed a single foot of territory of another country in this hemisphere. It has, indeed, made many sacrifices and even fought a major war, more than a half-century ago, to liberate Cuba from oppression by a European power. The American record of intervention has been criticized as "gunboat diplomacy," but not a single instance can be cited to show that the American purpose was tainted. Wherever a country has been temporarily occupied not only to protect American lives but to save the native people themselves from the greater dangers that faced them, the end result has been a withdrawal of the military contingents when peaceful conditions have been achieved.

In not all the instances have the villains who threatened these countries come from the outside, as there have been groups and factions which have selfishly exploited the peasants population and obstructed the reforms that could have improved the standard of living and the economic welfare of the country affected.

Today in Santa Domingo the main source of trouble will not be eradicated unless the forces of the United States remain in the Dominican Republic—either alone or with the military units of the Organization of American States—long enough to make certain that an established government will deal effectively with efforts of the Communists to carry on subversive measures.

The Washington Government has a grave problem on its hands and deserves the support of Members of Congress of both parties. The situation in the Dominican Republic concerns not just that tiny island but the future of all other countries in the Caribbean. If abandoned, Latin American can crumble just as southeast Asia can disintegrate, and this could lead to a third world war.

[From the Washington Star, May 11, 1965]

#### THE MONROE DOCTRINE, 20TH CENTURY

(By Eric Sevareid)

President Johnson has enlarged the war in southeast Asia by bombing the territory of a foreign government with which we are not legally at war and he has invaded the territory of a Latin American country without benefit of an invitation or even the prior approval of other hemisphere governments in the Organization of American States.

Domestic critics have said that he has made an ex post facto rationalization of the bombing by emphasizing that North Vietnam is the vital source spring of the fighting in South Vietnam. Domestic critics now argue that he similarly rationalizes the Dominican intervention by emphasizing what evidence there is that Communists were taking over the people's uprising.

There are surface similarities between the two actions, but they remain on the surface. They need not and ought not be lumped together by the President's detractors or by his supporters. Critics of his Asian policy may well turn out to be wrong in the end, but there are much stronger grounds for this criticism than for criticism of his action in the Dominican Republic. Vietnam lies very far away from the United States and very close to a major power that just might enter that war. The Dominican Republic lies very close to us, very far from any other great power and carries no danger of international war.

What deeply puzzles those who are dubious of our Vietnam policies is how we are to make a victory there work, over the long haul, how that area, driven by tribal and sectarian rivalries, with almost no national consciousness, is to be kept stable and in one piece. The Dominican Republic is far more able to usefully employ economic assistance and does have a strong national sense, however, bitter its class enmities. Our aims there have much more chance of realization.

The OAS is a useful entity; we ought to consult it before we act if circumstances make it safe to do so. In the Dominican situation affairs were moving much too rapidly, as, in 1960, the North Koreans were moving much too rapidly for President Truman to throw out the question of American intervention for congressional debate. It would be very nice, indeed, if we could always act by the book. But we cannot always do so in this new era of the quick Communist coup. We cannot because no Latin American government is politically or militarily able to act quickly in concert with us. If it is not too strong, a word, that is the hypocrisy built into the Organization of American States. Its other members can share its protection, they will not, because they cannot, share the ultimate responsibility of action.

The New York Times, which President Johnson privately refers to as a "yes—but" newspaper, seems to be sad that because of his quick intervention we will never know whether or not the Dominican uprising was falling into the hands of the Communists or not. There are worse sorrows, as Castro has demonstrated to us.

The Dominican Republic is not going to be the last of our dramatic difficulties in this hemisphere, even though the President has used it as an example of what to expect, for the benefit of Latin Communists. And we will save ourselves a great deal of moral and intellectual agony as the future unfolds if only we can clear from our minds certain bits of debris:

1. The notion that the development work of the "Allianza" is the true alternative to physical action to stop communism. In the long, long haul—perhaps several decades—

this is probably correct, but Communists in those countries are lighting very short fuses.

2. The notion that all military regimes in Latin America are equally bad. The truth is that in some Latin countries educated, modern military leaders are quite as enlightened and responsible as their political opposite numbers. We simply cannot equate the military now trying to put order into Brazil or the military who took over Peru and produced the free election they had pledged with military characters like a Trujillo or a Batista. Progress without stability is an impossibility and the bitter truth is that in some Latin countries there are times when the sole element of stability is the military.

3. The notion that the United States is reverting to the "big stick," gunboat diplomacy that characterized the earlier third of this century. We are not. There is nothing in Latin America that we want to conquer or possess; and we no longer swing our weight for any pleasurable sensations of fancied moral or racial superiority. Times have changed in another respect: we are now up against an international conspiracy that seeks to unravel from within societies that do not possess the social glue that comes from a long tradition of functioning democracy.

It is a fearful commitment the President has made. We shall prevent, by force if necessary, the establishment of another Communist regime in this hemisphere. It is the Monroe Doctrine, 20th century edition, harder to fulfill than the original version, but even more relevant to the realities.

[From the New York Times, May 10, 1965]

SANTO DOMINGO AND "NONINTERVENTION"

(By Herbert L. Matthews)

Back in 1904, the year of our first intervention in the Dominican Republic, it was suggested to President Theodore Roosevelt that the country be annexed. "I have no more desire to take over Santo Domingo," the historian Foster Rhea Dulles quotes the President as saying, "that a gorged boa constrictor would have to swallow a porcupine."

President Johnson, who likewise has no desire to annex the Dominican Republic, must nevertheless feel as if he has swallowed something highly indigestible. Like "Teddy" Roosevelt, he did intervene, and by so doing he violated what is the most treasured of Latin American doctrines—the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of a Latin country.

#### A NEW DOCTRINE

The "Johnson doctrine"—that the United States will intervene automatically against the threat of a Communist takeover in any Latin American country—involves a basic conflict with this nonintervention principle. So does the Monroe Doctrine, which has never been welcomed by our southern neighbors, although it was passively accepted. The historic doctrine is a unilateral instrument of American policy. No Latin American nation need be consulted to implement it. No Latin American nation has the power to stop the United States from applying either the Monroe or the Johnson doctrine.

But the price, this being 1965 and not 1823 or 1904, would be to make a shambles of the Inter-American System, as it was painfully and doggedly built up in conference after conference over more than half a century.

#### HISTORY TURNS BACK

A key article of the OAS Charter, No. 17, reads:

"The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily of military occupation or if other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, under any grounds whatever."

The Dominican intervention was a throw-back to 1904 in more ways than one. In that year President Roosevelt asserted a right on

the part of the United States to exercise a "police power" in Latin America. This was the famous "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, which was supposed to have been ended for all time in 1928.

What is still worse from the Latin-American viewpoint is that Mr. Johnson's intervention was a throwback to the Caribbean interventions in Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic. They began with Santo Domingo and they ended in the same capital in 1941 when the United States gave up its treaty rights of intervention. Then they began again on April 28, 1964, in—once more—the Dominican Republic.

The longest intervention in that country was the 8-year occupation by American marines from 1916 to 1924. That time it was President Woodrow Wilson who acted.

The landing by Marines in May 1916 was as flagrant a case of supporting an unpopular executive (President Jimenez had been impeached on May 1) and backing a corrupted status quo for reasons of "dollar diplomacy" as is to be found in our relations with Latin America. A provisional government headed by a General Arias was thrown out by the Marines, who forced the general to surrender.

When the Americans withdrew 8 years later, the excellent reforms they had forced upon the Dominican people crumbled away quickly. After all, they had been imposed by foreigners who had violated Dominican sovereignty. This happened in the case of all the American occupations in the Caribbean and Central America.

What the United States did leave in 1924 was a military and police structure whose members were armed and trained by Americans, out of which in the course of nature came a military dictator, a certain Lt. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, a protégé of the Marines. The rest is history.

The whole Caribbean history helps explain the firmness of Latin-American opposition to U.S. intervention in their internal affairs. It is now being argued—for instance, by Mr. Johnson's special envoy to South America, W. Averell Harriman—that the historic doctrine of nonintervention is obsolete. It was aimed against external aggression, whereas the present danger is from internal Communist aggression. The United States, mindful of the 1962 missile crisis, is primarily concerned with the danger of "another Cuba."

Latin Americans, while overwhelmingly anti-Communist, are convinced that the defense against Communist penetration must not become an excuse for renewed U.S. intervention, with all its bitter memories. They demonstrated their hostility to Communist incursions by an OAS condemnation of Cuba last year for shipping arms to Venezuela's terrorists.

#### OAS STEPS IN

Now they have voted, by a two-thirds majority, to set an inter-American peace force as an instrument for collective responsibility in this hemisphere. Its immediate objective is to do whatever is now possible to reduce and shorten the American occupation of Santo Domingo.

In Latin America the principle of nonintervention is very much alive; and, so far as the Latins are concerned, it is still chiefly aimed against the kind of military intervention just carried out by the United States in the Dominican Republic.

[From the Sunday Star, May 23, 1965]

SANTO DOMINGO REPORTING

If the President feels he is being badly used by segments of the American press in their reporting from Santo Domingo, he is not without justification.

For example, a newspaper of national circulation published a four-column photograph on its front page Friday. The picture

showed a U.S. Marine firing at a target which could not be seen. But the caption read: "On the fence in Santo Domingo, an American Marine, under orders to stay neutral, fires at a sniper."

This is the grossest sort of distortion. The fact is that our troops in Santo Domingo are under orders to return sniper fire if snipers fire at them. And this presumably is what the Marine in the photograph was doing.

A correspondent for the same newspaper reported on May 2 that "U.S. troops yesterday took over the job of wiping out rebel resistance to the Dominican Republic's new military junta." This certainly is not correct. Quite obviously, there has been no massive intervention by our troops. And if they had taken over the job of wiping out rebel resistance 3 weeks ago, it would have been wiped out by this time.

There may have been, and probably have been, instances in which some of our troops have not observed what Secretary of State Dean Rusk calls the policy of "strict neutrality" which they are under orders to obey. In any conflict as disorganized as that in Santo Domingo there are bound to be some incidents which do not conform to a policy of strict neutrality. But it is an absurdity, in our judgment, to claim, as has been claimed, that "while the United States in diplomatic negotiations with the rebels is leaning toward the overwhelming public opinion supporting the Caamaño forces, the U.S. military and the junta are going about methodically destroying those people to whom the United States is leaning diplomatically." The junta evidently is attempting a methodical destruction of the rebel forces. But we are not aware of any evidence that the American troops are participating in this methodical effort.

There is no denying that the President has a real mess on his hands in the Dominican Republic. He may not know how to get out of it. But he is trying to find a way out, and this effort should not be made more difficult by careless, inaccurate or irresponsible reporting.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR ADLAI E. STEVENSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC QUESTION

Mr. President, we have by now heard the complete catalogue of all the past sins—relevant and irrelevant, real and imaginary—committed by the U.S. Government over the past century or so.

Mr. President, there is something ludicrous—and transparently false—in the spectacle of Ambassador Fedorenko talking about the sanctity of the doctrine of nonintervention. I shall not detain you with the long and sorry record of interventions and attempted interventions by Communist-controlled states in the affairs of other nations. It is enough to recall the following statements of the Havana Conference of the Communist Parties of Latin America last November:

"Active aid should be given to those who are subject at present to cruel repressions—for instance, the freedom fighters in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti.

"An active movement of solidarity of all the Latin American countries with the liberation struggle of the people of Venezuela should be organized on a continent-wide scale.

"It is necessary to intensify the movements of solidarity with the people of Panama who are waging a struggle against imperialism in difficult conditions."

And this recalls the opening statement of the representative of Cuba in which he expressed with moving eloquence his passionate devotion to international law and international organization and nonintervention. This display of feeling comes from the repre-

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sentative of a government which invited Soviet missiles into Cuba, which has ostracized itself from the peaceful society of the Western Hemisphere—which has proclaimed its contempt for the Organization of American States and all its works—which works to subvert the governments and destroy the machinery of the Inter-American community.

Well, Mr. President, enough of this. The Security Council is not seized with the subject of Vietnam, of the Congo—nor with responsibility for passing historical judgments on events that occurred in the last century or in the last generation. The Security Council is seized with the subject of the Dominican Republic in the here and now.

I therefore propose to address myself once again to the Dominican Republic situation and to review once more in simple and factual form the activities of my Government in connection with those events. I hope we can then recognize that effective action is currently being taken by the proper regional body, the OAS, and permit it to do its work.

The basic nature and the overriding purpose of my Government's action can be summed up in one simple sentence, which I shall read slowly: The U.S. action in the Dominican Republic was emergency action taken to protect lives and to give the Inter-American system a chance to deal with a situation within its competence.

On April 28 unburied bodies lay in the streets of Santo Domingo while unorganized and rival bands roamed the city committing murder and arson. Agents trained abroad for internal subversion were passing out arms and taking control of marauding groups. The embassies of half a dozen nations were attacked.

The rebels claimed to have formed a government but some of their leaders were taking refuge in foreign embassies. The fact of the matter is that no one was in charge and no one was capable of taking charge.

In brief, a human and political tragedy of the first magnitude was at hand.

And this is not our judgment but the judgment of Dominican security officials who notified the U.S. Embassy that the situation was completely out of hand, that the city police force had disintegrated, and that no guarantees could be given for the safety of thousands of foreign residents of Santo Domingo, including several thousand citizens of the United States.

On the same day, April 28, the only apparent responsible authority in Santo Domingo addressed a request to the U.S. Government to send in armed forces.

At this point the U.S. Government had three choices of action.

First, we could have decided not to do anything—at least for the time being. But the lives of thousands of people from nearly 40 countries hung in the balance.

Second, we could have recognized the military junta claiming to be the government and could have responded to its request for military support. But this would have amounted to taking sides in an internal struggle among Dominican political factions and such a course of action would have been inconsistent with the principles that govern the Inter-American system.

Third, we could send in our own security forces on a provisional basis until the Organization of American States could meet and consult and decide what to do.

## III

It is at moments like this that nations which possess the capacity to act must make their decisions to exercise or not exercise the unwanted responsibility that sometimes devolves upon them suddenly and unexpectedly. In this case—when hours and even minutes counted—there was no time for deliberate consultation and for the organiza-

tion of international machinery which did not yet exist.

My Government elected the third alternative.

The United States initially landed troops under these emergency conditions to preserve the lives of foreign nationals—nationals of the United States and of many other countries. Such action is justified both on humanitarian and legal grounds.

## IV

I am aware, Mr. President, that some have felt that perhaps we moved too hastily—that more time should have been allowed for the OAS to go into action. My reply to them is this: Try to imagine, if you can, the fate of Santo Domingo if the United States had not acted when it did.

A full week has passed since April 28 and the only effective forces of law and order in and around the capital city of Santo Domingo this afternoon are still much to our regret, the U.S. forces dispatched there during the past week.

As it turned out, the emergency dispatch of these forces was undertaken just in time to avert wholesale deaths by violence and terrorism, compounded by the threat of disease and starvation. The death toll already had reached at least 1,000 and probably more than 1,500. By now, some 4,067 persons have been evacuated, of whom 2,694 are U.S. citizens and about 1,373 are citizens of 41 other nations, and 4 stateless persons.

Emergency shipments of medical supplies and of food have been rushed to the scene. They are now being distributed to all persons in need without regard to their political affiliation by the Dominican Red Cross, CARE, a relief organization of the Catholic church, and by U.S. forces. This morning food from this country has been distributed in the so-called rebel held area by clergymen and officials of the Dominican Red Cross.

This is a task of considerable magnitude and of great urgency. Economic activity has been at a standstill for 10 days. People in Santo Domingo are not working and they are not being paid. Increasing numbers of them are hungry.

We are now bringing in 60 tons of rice daily, which is enough to feed about one-quarter of a million people. Distribution is being made from checkpoints around the neutral security zone and three food distribution centers are being established in areas outside the center of town to be manned by Dominican businessmen and clergymen. Twenty-five trucks have been borrowed to handle the food supplies for distribution to Santo Domingo and in areas of the countryside which are dependent upon the city for

## V

their supply of food.

So I leave it to the conscience of every fair and humane person to decide for himself whether the United States acted in precipitance haste a week ago tonight.

I am aware, Mr. President, that some have questioned the need for such a large force as the United States has dispatched to the Dominican Republic. Perhaps a few words on this point would prove enlightening.

In times of peace and tranquillity a police force of 8,000 men is employed to maintain law and order in the city of Santo Domingo alone. Is it surprising that roughly twice that many men would be needed to restore order in circumstances that amounted to civil war? Would a larger or smaller force minimize the number of casualties on all sides?

Moreover, this force has many tasks. It has the task of evacuating civilians; and despite the speed at which it has worked, several thousand foreign residents have still not been evacuated.

It has the task of establishing and guarding a large neutral security zone against

sniper fire around the clock; and only yesterday two more foreign embassies urged the extension of the security zone to include their property.

It has the task of handling and distributing food and medical supplies; and this part of the job grows daily heavier rather than lighter.

It has the task of protecting and supporting the emissaries of the OAS which are seeking to mediate the underlying dispute and to arrange conditions under which the people of the Dominican Republic can exercise their right to choose their own officials without outside subversion or interference of any kind.

Now, Mr. President, that concludes my review of the basic facts with respect to the first of the two purposes of the action undertaken by my Government: to protect lives and sustain life in a large city paralyzed by violence and anarchy.

The mission has been carried out with extraordinary skill and bravery and we are rewarded by the gratitude of those who have been protected and guided to safe havens. And we feel we have done our humane duty by supplying emergency medical care to the wounded and sick and food to hungry thousands.

I might mention in passing that the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union has tried to make something of the fact that not a single citizen of the United States had been killed in Santo Domingo. And let me inform him that not a single other foreign resident has been lost in the evacuation. I do not suppose Ambassador Fedorenko would have insisted on either U.S. citizens or other foreign nationals being killed as a condition precedent to our action. The reason why no one was killed is obvious: Their rescuers got there in time, in sufficient force, and acted with sufficient dispatch to get them to safety.

## VI

Now for the second purpose for which we acted: to give the Inter-American system an opportunity to deal with a situation within its competence.

The United States continues its presence in the Dominican Republic for this additional purpose of preserving the capacity of the OAS to function in the manner intended by its charter—to achieve peace and justice by securing a cease-fire and the reestablishment of processes within which Dominicans can choose their own government, free from outside interference.

The primary purposes for which the American States established the OAS, as set forth in article I of its charter, were "to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence." Please note, if you will, that the first purpose of the Organization of American States is "an order of peace and justice."

There are, of course, certain basic principles which the OAS seeks to promote throughout the hemisphere. One of these is respect for the fundamental rights of the individual; and in Santo Domingo last week not only were these rights being obliterated but individuals were being obliterated.

Another fundamental principle of the Inter-American system is the effective exercise of representative democracy. This principle is clearly set out in the charter of OAS, the Rio Treaty, and the charter of the Alliance for Progress. But in Santo Domingo the prospects for representative government have been violently challenged.

After U.S. forces arrived it became apparent that the structure of government had broken down to a point where there was not only no authority capable of preserving law and order but there was no

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méchanism by which the Dominican people could freely choose their own government.

The obligations of nonintervention contained in articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter did not preclude the use of armed forces for the humanitarian purpose of saving lives of foreigners. Nor did those obligations require the United States to withdraw its forces immediately, when it was apparent that there was no local means of keeping order pending the creating of a government capable of keeping order. It would have been irresponsible for the United States to withdraw its forces when such a course would have endangered the lives of those not yet evacuated and would have led to full-scale resumption of bloody warfare among the contending Dominican factors.

The United States has acted to preserve the situation so that the organs of the Inter-American system may carry out their intended responsibilities under Inter-American treaties and assist the people of the Dominican Republic in reestablishing democratic government under conditions of public order.

On the same evening, April 28, when the United States initially dispatched forces to Santo Domingo, my government also requested an urgent meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States. A meeting of the council was held on the morning of April 29, and organs of the OAS proceeded to meet in continuing session thereafter.

The OAS first issued a call for a cease-fire and appealed to the papal nuncio in Santo Domingo to use his good offices in an effort to help bring it about—then it called for the establishment of the neutral international safety zone—then it dispatched the Secretary General to give assistance on the scene, then it sent a five-nation commission to the Dominican capital to mediate an end to hostilities and the beginning of a political settlement.

In the course of these proceedings, Mr. President, the U.S. delegate, in addition to supporting the resolutions adopted, has reaffirmed our adherence to the Inter-American system, including the doctrines of nonintervention and self-determination. He has urged the OAS to help restore constitutional government by free choice, deplored the lack of available Inter-American machinery to deal with such emergencies, and approved the establishment of such machinery as soon as possible.

We have asked the OAS repeatedly to assume responsibility in the Dominican Republic as a common duty and a common task. And we have earnestly requested the organization to act with a sense of urgency to relieve the United States of an unwanted burden.

As things stand now, the OAS commission is on the scene and appears to be making hopeful progress. Although it has not been fully respected by all hands an initial cease-fire was arranged on April 30. And yesterday the commission reported by cable that agreement had been reached with the contending parties on confirmation of the cease-fire, demarcation, and enlargement of the security zone to include all embassies, evacuation of asylees and refugees, and distribution of food, medicine, and medical equipment to all sectors of the population without regard to parties.

And today the commission also informed the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS as follows: "We consider that it would be useful, in order to aid in bringing a return of the Dominican situation to normality, for the member states that are in a position to do so to establish a combined Inter-American military force under the Organization of American States to achieve the objectives that are set by the meeting of consultation."

This is to say that the commission which is on the scene has recommended adoption of

a resolution which the OAS is now considering for an Inter-American force to perform the peacekeeping duties which my government reluctantly assumed under the desperate conditions prevailing a week ago tonight. We are now hopeful that such action will be taken very soon.

And President Johnson has stated: "All that we are in the Dominican Republic for is to preserve freedom and to save those people from conquest. And the moment that the Organization of American States can present a plan that will bring peace on the island, permit us to evacuate our people, and give us some hope of stability, we will be the first to come back."

Mr. President, it is evident on the face of things that it is only the temporary presence of our forces in Santo Domingo which has made it possible for the Organization of American States to carry out its consultations, to organize its machinery, and to take its proper place on the scene of the fighting in the Dominican Republic.

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These are the essential facts of the situation in the matter before us. Obviously the situation is still far from clear and there are unknowns or imponderables in the swirling affairs of the Dominican Republic in recent days and weeks. Indeed, wherever conspiracy lurks there are hidden factors and secret forces at work—a fact which no doubt has much to do with the angry distortions and maliciously false allegations which we have heard from two speakers at this table in recent days.

The fact of the matter is that it appears that what began as a democratic revolution was quickly penetrated by a group of trained Communists. If that movement had succeeded in establishing itself as the government of the Dominican Republic, the events would have been irreversible. The OAS would have been deprived of any realistic possibility of assisting the Dominican people to determine their political future by the free exercise of self-determination.

It is not the "bogey of anticommunism," or a "time worn record," or an imaginary danger with which we are concerned—to borrow some of Ambassador Fedorenko's words.

In the Dominican Republic there are three Communist political organizations. They are the Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano (PSPD), Dominican Popular Socialist Party, which follows Moscow's direction; the Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD), Dominican Popular Movement; a small but aggressive Marxist-Leninist revolutionary party which follows the Chinese Communist ideological line; and the largest of the three, the Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio (APCJ), Fourteenth of June Political Group, which is Castro oriented and with connections to Soviet and Communist Chinese regimes as well.

All three of these parties have representatives in Cuba and have received training and financial support from abroad. All have participated in armed revolutionary attempts; the PSPD in the invasion of 1959; the MPD in guerrilla fighting in 1963; and the APCJ in the unsuccessful Castro-style guerrilla attempt of late 1963.

Direct involvement of Castro in Dominican affairs is also of long standing. As long ago as 1959 Castro organized, trained, and equipped an expedition which invaded the Dominican Republic, whose leadership included a Cuban army officer and which was escorted to Dominican shores by the Cuban Navy.

In November 1963 it launched another action against the Dominican Republic, unsuccessfully sending a paramilitary team with supplies of weapons to the north coast of the island.

In 1963 also the Castro and the Chinese-oriented Communist Parties of the Domini-

can Republic launched an open guerrilla warfare movement in the hinterland of the Dominican Republic. Dominicans known to have received training in Cuba took part in that abortive effort. The bulk of the captured rebels were deported in May 1964, and most of them became political exiles in France. From there, many have since traveled in the Soviet bloc countries, including Cuba, and Communist China.

Last year, Dominican Communists published the Marxist justification for their revolution in terms of national liberation, a handbook entitled "Seven Themes of Study." Later, in September, they issued a call for unity of the "forces of the left under the leadership of the Dominican Communist Party."

And in November the Havana Conference of the Communist Parties of Latin America, to which I have already referred, called for "active aid" to the so-called "freedom fighters" in Latin America.

Beginning in late 1964, various of the exiled Castro and Chinese party leaders began to infiltrate back into the Dominican Republic, some clandestinely, to rejoin their respective political organizations.

Then on the very evening of the army officers' revolt inspired by the PRD, the party of Juan Bosch, April 24, these top-level Communist leaders, especially those of the Moscow-oriented old-line Communist Party, the PSPD, seized upon the unstable situation as ripe for subversive exploitation. Word was issued to party members and to other extremist groups, calling for agitation and the staging of "spot rallies and demonstrations" in the streets.

Within 1 or 2 hours of the first rebel moves, members of the Castroist movement were busy in the streets of Santo Domingo.

Communist and Castroist leaders shortly thereafter got quantities of arms and ammunition from the armory at the "27 February" camp outside Santo Domingo, where rebelling army officers had seized control as the opening act of the coup. A sizable quantity of arms and ammunition thus fell into the hands of leaders of the PSPD—the Moscow party—and the members of this party were quickly formed into armed paramilitary teams which fanned out in the downtown and "Barrio" (slum) areas, taking control of secondary targets and organizing the inhabitants. At the same time a party military headquarters was established and arms collected from loyalist police, and military personnel were stored there.

With relatively tight discipline and effective organization, the extreme leftist groups, particularly the PSPD, but also, prominently, the MPD and the Castro movement, were soon providing a significant portion of the rebel forces and were decisively influencing the political leadership of the rebellion which, in the beginning, had been in the hands of the democratic leaders of the Bosch party.

This was the complexion of the rebellion when the key PRD leaders, who had organized the revolt to restore Bosch, began to take asylum.

Now who are some of these leaders who have sought to turn this rebellion into a Communist takeover?

Playing a key role in the tactical direction of the rebel forces is Manuel Gonzalez Gonzalez, an experienced Spanish Communist Party activist who has been in the Dominican Republic since 1940 and is a member of the Moscow party, and a purported Cuban intelligence agent.

Other PSPD leaders active in the revolt include Buenaventura Johnson, whose house is one of the party's munition dumps and strongholds, and Fidelio Despradel, who received guerrilla training in Cuba in 1963. Leading the organization of paramilitary units were Jaime Duran, who received paramilitary training in Cuba in 1962, and Juan



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Ducoudray, who has been a liaison link between Cuba and the Dominican Republic for the supply of weapons.

Also participating actively among others: Rafael De La Altagracia Mejia Lluberes, an APCJ leader, long-time Communist revolutionary. He was involved in a 1963 attempt to overthrow Venezuelan President Betancourt, and has had guerrilla training and political indoctrination course, Cuba 1963.

Nicolas Quirico Valdez Conde, a high-level PSPD member, who has lived in Moscow, speaks Russian fluently, and was Russian interpreter for Fidel Castro in Cuba.

Miguel Angel Deschamps Erickson, an MPD member, who received guerrilla warfare training and explosives course in Cuba in 1962, and carried instructions from Cuba to Dominican Republic for MPD in 1963.

Juan Miguel Roman Diaz, a high-level member of APCJ who was key man in guerrilla activities in the Dominican Republic in late 1963; and subsequently deported and went to Cuba in June 1964.

Mr. President, it may, of course, be said, I think accurately, that the bulk of the participants in the rebellion are not Communist and that even in the present leadership non-Communists are active. I do not purport to predict the future.

But I would remind you that only 12 men went to the hills with Castro in 1956 and that only a handful of Castro's own supporters were Communists. I would also remind you that Castro, too, came into power under cover of constitutionalism, moderation, and cooperation with others. But within months the true complexion appeared and the list of leaders imprisoned, expelled, or forced to flee once control was achieved is well known. It is an impressive list: the first provisional President of the revolutionary government, Dr. Manuel Urrutia; the first Prime Minister, Dr. Jose Miro Cardona; the first president of the supreme court, Dr. Emilio Menendez; nearly two-thirds of Castro's first cabinet, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roberto Agramonte, Minister of Treasury, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Minister of Labor, Manuel Fernandez, Minister of Agriculture Humberto Sori Marin, and Minister of Public Works, Manuel Ray; companions-in-arms of Fidel Castro, such as Sierra Maestra Commanders Hubert Matos, Mino Diaz, and Jorge Sotus; labor leaders such as David Salvador and Amaury Fragnals; editors and commentators such as Miguel Angel Quevedo, Luis Conte Aguero; even Juan Orta, the head of the Prime Minister's own office, and ultimately Castro's own sister.

Mr. President, participation in the inter-American system, to be meaningful, must take into account the modern-day reality that an attempt by a conspiratorial group, inspired from the outside, to seize control by force can be an assault upon the independence and integrity of a state. The rights and obligations of all members of the OAS must be seen in the light of this reality.

But the fact remains that the action of the United States in the Dominican Republic was not for the purpose of intervening in the affairs of the Dominican Republic or for the purpose of occupying that country. There is no new "doctrine" at work in that part of the world.

The fact remains that United States forces are not asserting any authority to govern any part of the Dominican Republic, nor do we want any such authority even in that neutral zone within the city of Santo Domingo. The fact remains that U.S. forces are not taking sides in the Dominican conflict—and explicitly declined to do so.

Thus the United States is in no sense acting against the Dominican Republic, but in the interests of the Dominican people.

Our action is for the purpose of helping to restore order and to preserve for the people

of that nation their right to freely choose their government.

To preserve that right, the United States has protected and evacuated foreign citizens from the danger zone and has provided the Organization of American States with the necessary time to take over its responsibilities in the area of its competence.

Whatever else has been said around this table, that is the whole story as far as it can be known, and these are the relevant facts in the matter before this council.

The case is now in the hands of the competent regional organization. This is an official OAS Commission as the scene actively engaged in negotiations which appear to have reached an advanced stage. The council of the OAS was in session this morning.

I therefore trust that this council will keep the question of the Dominican Republic under review until the Organization of American States completes its work and the people of the Dominican Republic have been able to exercise their own political choice.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR ADLAI E. STEVENSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC QUESTION, MAY 5, 1965

Mr. President, I noted what you said about the hour and I noted it with sympathy. I shall try to be very brief.

At the outset of his remarks, Mr. Fedorenko compared me to a reptile. Well, I must say I had not expected to be called a reptile by Ambassador Fedorenko, which adds another colorful epithet to his rich inventory of discourtesies. However, I have been listening to these gracious remarks from representatives of the Soviet Union on and off since 1945 and I am neither surprised nor, indeed, upset. I am insulated by experience from Soviet diplomatic niceties. Moreover, I won't even react in the manner of reptiles by striking back.

Ambassador Fedorenko asks me how many U.S. troops were in the Dominican Republic. Well, I sent out for an evening paper where the figures are published daily, but I haven't got it. However, I have called my Government and as of 5 o'clock the figure was 17,134. I am sorry that that was the figure as of an hour ago, but that was when you asked me.

As to what these forces are doing, I thought I explained that at some length. I explained that they were policing the city, that they were guarding the neutral safety zone, they were evacuating asylees and refugees, they were distributing food and medicine. But evidently Ambassador Fedorenko was not listening when I spoke and I commend to him the transcript of my remarks which will appear in tomorrow's journal, including the information that he apparently overlooked, that it took 8,000 police to maintain order in Santo Domingo in peaceful times when there was a police force.

At the end of his remarks just now, he raised the question of article 53 of the charter. As to this allegation, that the Organization of American States cannot act because enforcement action requires Security Council approval under article 53, there is, of course, a long history of Soviet obstruction and effort to equate all OAS regional action to enforcement action. The reason is obvious because the Soviet Union could then veto the action in the Security Council.

But the steps being taken by the OAS do not constitute enforcement action within the meaning of the United Nations Charter. What enforcement action is being taken against the Dominican Republic? None. What order is being enforced? None. What is being done by the Organization of American States is fully within the proper scope of the authority of regional organizations to

deal with the maintenance of peace and security, to quote the language of the charter, within their jurisdiction as provided for by article 52. This issue has, of course, as all of us at this table know, been exhaustively considered in the Security Council in the past and I think hardly requires reopening at this time.

The Soviet representative has again laid great emphasis this afternoon on nonintervention in the affairs of the Dominican Republic. In my remarks earlier today, I described in some detail the Communist intervention in the Dominican Republic which has gone on for some years and which was renewed a few hours after the revolt broke out on April 24. Of course, Communist intervention begins in a clandestine and secret fashion. I reminded the Council of the manner in which the Communist took over the Cuban revolution and executed or exiled many of the original leaders of that revolution. The result of such Communist intervention is however decisive. Once a country has been taken over, democratic liberties are destroyed and the opportunity for self-determination ends. That is why the Communist intervention in the Dominican Republic is the most vicious and the most fatal which can be imagined.

And now perhaps you will permit me to ask Ambassador Fedorenko and his Cuban colleague a question: How many Communist agents are now active in the armed uprising in the Dominican Republic? In other words, how many agents of international communism are intervening arms in hand with the obvious intention of setting up another Castro regime in that unfortunate country? If he has to cable to Moscow and to Havana for the latest statistics, we shall be happy to wait until tomorrow for his reply.

Mr. President, the United States has repeatedly announced its intention of withdrawing its forces from the Dominican Republic as soon as arrangements have been made by the OAS for the establishment of an indigenous Dominican Government which will assure the people of that country their right to determine their own future. I believe there are few around this table who do not believe that this pledge will be kept. In Cuba, on the other hand, despite Mr. Castro's pledge of free elections, he has never dared to hold them. The Cuban people have never been given a chance to choose their own government. We doubt that the Communists ever will give them that chance. And I believe that no one around this table, except perhaps Ambassador Fedorenko and his Cuban colleague, want that to happen to the Dominican Republic.

I think, Mr. President, that in view of the hour and the circumstances and the fact that everything has been said and resaid so many times, that I shall detain you no longer. I should welcome an answer to the question that I asked the Soviet ambassador. (In a further intervention, Ambassador Stevenson said:)

Ho hum. Mr. President, the representative of the Soviet Union asked me one question and I got him the answer. And now he has asked me a lot more. I think I have perhaps nothing more to say except that I pray God that I can grow up to be a big boy and ask questions.

(In another intervention, Ambassador Stevenson said:)

I know my proverbs, too, but I am going to mercifully spare both my colleague, Ambassador Fedorenko, and the members of this Security Council from repeating any of them at this hour. But I would like to tell you a story that an old lawyer once told me when I was a young practitioner in my home State of Illinois. He said, "My boy, if you haven't got the facts, argue the law before the jury; and if the law isn't with you, argue the facts; and if you have neither the facts nor the law, then just talk a lot."

Thank you, sir.

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Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER FOR RECESS UNTIL NOON TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 1564) to enforce the 15th amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the vote on the Miller amendment—which is to occur at 12:20 p.m. tomorrow—has been concluded, the time until 1 o'clock p.m. be equally divided between the distinguished Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN] and the majority leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### REPLY TO WALL STREET JOURNAL CRITICISM OF UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, last Tuesday, May 18, the Wall Street Journal published a lead editorial entitled "Poor Statistics and Worse Economics." The editorial attacked the present statistical methods of our Government in determining unemployment in this country. It is a serious matter when the leading financial journal of the United States attacks the statistics which are used by our Government and by Congress in determining much of our policy.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Statistics of the Joint Economic Committee, I was particularly concerned with the editorial, so I wrote to Mr. Raymond T. Bowman, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget. Mr. Bowman is more directly responsible for policy in the statistics field in the executive branch of the Government than anyone else. He has a heavy responsibility for recommending policy with regard to all our statistical pro-

grams. He is a man of distinguished ability.

Frankly, when I read the Wall Street Journal editorial I recalled that the many outstanding statisticians, from all over the world, who testified before our Joint Congressional Economic Committee on our statistics program, had unanimously concluded that ours are the best statistics to be obtained anywhere in the world, although, of course, they are subject to criticism and improvement.

The reply by Mr. Bowman should be called to the attention of the Congress and the country, in view of the fact that our policies are seriously influenced by the statistics concerning the level of unemployment in our country.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD the editorial entitled "Poor Statistics and Worse Economics," published in the Wall Street Journal of May 18, and Mr. Bowman's letter to me dated May 20, which analyzes, point by point, the arguments set forth in the editorial.

There being no objection, the editorial and letter were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

#### BUREAU OF THE BUDGET,

Washington, D.C., May 20, 1965.

Hon. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Economic Statistics, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: The criticism of the Federal unemployment figures which appeared in an editorial in the May 18 issue of the Wall Street Journal is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of the statistics. Economists both in and out of Government do, of course, interpret these figures and do not always arrive at the same interpretation of them as the Wall Street Journal.

Unemployment is measured in order to determine the total number of persons not employed who are offering their services in a free labor market. This is an important measure of available manpower not being utilized by the economy. The Employment Act of 1946 made it the official policy of the Federal Government to foster and promote conditions under which there will be useful employment opportunities "for those able, willing, and seeking to work." One of the most important functions of the monthly statistics is to measure the degree of success with which the American economy is achieving this goal.

The complaint of the Journal seems to be that the unemployment measure "does not provide an accurate estimate of how serious is the need for more jobs." I want to make two points in this connection. First, the unemployment statistics do provide a basis for assessing the effect of idle manpower on the economy and the unemployed individuals. Second, the measure of unemployment was never intended to be and should not be restricted to those who are in dire need of a job.

In connection with my first point it should be fairly obvious that idle resource—unused plant, facilities, excessive inventories, or idle manpower seeking jobs—diminishes the efficiency of the economy. Unemployment also affects the individual jobseeker, including those who may not "need" the job. Employment is not only a means for meeting the pressing needs of individuals but, in part at least and end in itself—or at least a means to much more advanced desires.

My second point is that just as employment includes those who have a job whether they need one or not, so unemployment

includes those who seek a job whether they need it or not. It should be clearly recognized that need is largely subjective and very difficult to measure in a practical and objective manner. Working wives want their families to have the things their earnings can provide. Many teenagers, even those going to school, wish to contribute to their own support or to save for future educational or other purposes. Married women and teenagers alone account for over one-fourth of the total of persons counted as employed. Surely if we count them as employed when they are working we should count them as unemployed when they do not have a job and are seeking one.

What I have said above, however, should not be interpreted to mean that the degree of personal hardship resulting from unemployment is identical for all unemployed persons. Nor that these differences should not be taken into account in the development of social policy. But my point clearly is that measuring unemployment (in a free society) cannot appropriately be based on the need of the individual for a job—but must be based on his not having a job and seeking one.

For the reasons just noted, and in recognition of the fact that no single figure on unemployment can possibly meet all analytical purposes, the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes each month in Employment and Earnings statistics showing employment and unemployment by age, sex, color, marital status, industry, and occupation, with hours of work for the employed and duration of unemployment for the unemployed. The unemployment rates for household heads, for married women, for persons living alone are all published each month in the detailed report.

No one would deny that unemployment works a much greater hardship on married men with family responsibilities than on teenagers or housewives looking for ways to earn extra money. As the Wall Street Journal editorial points out, the Labor Department does publish in its first summary report the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for married men. Which in April 1965 was 2.5 percent. In addition, in the same release separate unemployment rates are published for teenagers, adult women, men 20 to 24 years of age, men 25 years of age and over, and many other groups. The unemployed are subdivided according to the duration of their unemployment and according to whether they were seeking full- or part-time work. For example, in April 1965, 600,000 of the 3.6 million unemployed were looking for part-time jobs. This figure is published very prominently on the very first table of the first release of the figures each month. (A copy of the April report is enclosed for your information.)

The Wall Street Journal is satisfied that the jobless rate for married men is "for all practical purposes full employment." They seem to imply that other groups need not concern us greatly. They note that married men "after all are, generally speaking, the people who do need the work and who comprise the bulk of the labor force." They further note that "By any standard they (married men) are far more deserving of concern than the jobless teenagers about whom there is so much weeping."

This seems a somewhat different emphasis than set forth by Mr. Lubell in an earlier article in the series of articles dealing with unemployment to which the Wall Street Journal editorial refers. Mr. Lubell says in his article entitled "The Teenager Crisis," "We will need not only further increases in available jobs, but a frontal assault on the many restrictive barriers that wall the jobless off from the more secure, prospering part of the economy."